While associated with the firm, registered representatives made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to purchasers of unsecured bridge notes and warrants to purchase common stock of a successor company.

The registered representatives:

• guaranteed customers that they would receive back their principal investment plus returns, failed to inform investors of any risks associated with the investments and did not discuss the risks outlined in the private placement memorandum (PPM) that could result in them losing their entire investment. The registered representatives had no reasonable basis for the guarantees given the description of the placement agent’s limited role in the PPM; and
• provided unwarranted price predictions to customers regarding the future price of common stock for which the warrants would be exchangeable and guaranteed the payment at maturity of promissory notes, which led customers to believe that funds raised by the sale of the anticipated private placement would be held in escrow for redemption of the promissory notes.

The Firm, acting through a registered representative, made misrepresentations and/or omissions of material fact to customers in connection with the sale of the private placement of firm units consisting of Class B common stock and warrants to purchase Class A common stock; the PPM stated that the investment was speculative, involving a high degree of risk and was only suitable for persons who could risk losing their entire investment. The representative represented to customers that he would invest their funds in another private placement and in direct contradiction, invested the funds in the firm private placement.

The Representative recommended and effected the sale of these securities without having a reasonable basis to believe that the transactions were suitable given the customers’ financial circumstances and conditions, and their investment objectives. The representative recommended customers use margin in their accounts, which was unsuitable given their risk tolerance and investment objectives, and he exercised discretion without prior written authorization in customers’ accounts.

Acting through Locy, its chief operating officer (COO) and president, the Firm failed to reasonably supervise the registered representative and failed to follow up on “red flags” that should have alerted him to the need to investigate the representative’s sales practices and determine whether trading restrictions, heightened supervision or discipline were warranted. Moreover, despite numerous red flags, the firm took no steps to contact customers or place the representative on heightened supervision, although it later placed limits only on the representative’s use of margin. The firm eventually suspended his trading authority after additional large margin calls, and Locy failed to ensure that the representative was making accurate representations and suitable recommendations.

Turbeville, the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO), and Locy delegated responsibility to Mercier, the firm’s chief compliance officer (CCO), to conduct due diligence on a company and were aware of red flags regarding its offering but did not take steps to investigate. 

Acting through Turbeville, Locy and Mercier, the Firm failed to establish, maintain and enforce supervisory procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of NASD Rule 2310 regarding suitability; under the firm’s written supervisory procedures (WSPs), Mercier was responsible for ensuring the offering complied with due diligence requirements but performed only a superficial review and failed to complete the steps required by the WSPs; Locy never evaluated the company’s financial situation and was unsure if a certified public accountant (CPA) audited the financials, and no one visited the company’s facility. Neither Turbeville nor Locy took any steps to ensure Mercier had completed the due diligence process. Turbeville and Locy created the firm’s deficient supervisory system; the firm’s procedures were inadequate to prevent and detect unsuitable recommendations resulting from excessive trading, excessive use of margin and over-concentration; principals did not review trades or correspondence; and the firm’s new account application process was flawed because a reviewing principal was unable to obtain an accurate picture of customers’ financial status, investment objectives and investment history when reviewing a transaction for suitability. The firm’s procedures failed to identify specific reports that its compliance department was to review and did not provide guidance on the actions or analysis that should occur in response to the reports; Turbeville and Locy knew, or should have known, of the compliance department’s limited reviews, but neither of them took steps to address the inadequate system.

Brookstone Securities, Inc.: Censured; Fine $200,000

David William Locy (Principal): Fined $10,000; Suspended from 3 months in Principal capacity only

Mark Mather Mercier (Principal): Fined $5,000; Suspended from 3 months in Principal capacity only

Antony Lee Turbeville (Principal): Fined $10,000; Suspended from 3 months in Principal capacity only

Meyer verbally informed his supervisors of his outside business activities and his business plans, but failed to provide his firm with prompt written notice of his outside business activities, for which he accepted compensation. Without his relative’s knowledge, Meyer conducted subaccount transfers, or transactions, in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) the relative held to his personal account, which held only a variable annuity contract.  The annuity sub-account transactions reduced the value of the variable annuity contract by $1,395.15 by the time the account was formally transferred to his relative.

Meyer transferred $1,800 from the relative’s IRA to his personal bank account. The firm immediately reversed the transaction as well as reimbursed Meyer’s relative $1,395.15 for the account’s reduction in value caused by Meyer’s transactions. Meyer has made full restitution to the firm.

McGrath failed to reasonably supervise a registered representative who recommended and effected unsuitable and excessive trading in a customer’s account. McGrath had supervisory responsibility over the registered representative and was responsible for reviewing his securities recommendations to ensure compliance with member firm procedures and applicable securities rules. McGrath failed to reasonably supervise the registered representative by, among other things, failing to enforce firm account procedures and failing to respond to red flags regarding the registered representative’s trading activity in the customer’s account.

The firm’s supervisory procedures required McGrath to review account transactions, such as the registered representative’s recommended transactions in the customer’s account, on a daily and monthly basis for, among other things, general suitability, excessive trading and churning, in-and-out trading and excessive commissions and fees; the firm’s procedures also required that McGrath review all exception reports related to the individuals who he supervised and take appropriate measures as necessary. Through these required reviews, McGrath was aware of red flags of possible misconduct in the customer’s account, including frequent short-term trading, excessive commission and margin charges, high turnover and cost-to-equity ratios, and substantial trading losses, and the account frequently appeared on the firm’s exception reports; McGrath failed to reasonably respond to and address the red flags in the customer’s account.

McGrath never spoke with the customer despite the fact that the firm’s compliance department sent several emails to McGrath advising him that the customer’s account needed customer contact as required by the firm’s WSPs; McGrath never spoke with the customer directly to confirm that he was aware of the activity level in his account or that such activity was appropriate in light of his financial circumstances and investment objectives.

McGrath failed to ensure that an Active Account Suitability Supplement and Questionnaire was sent to the customer within the time frame the firm’s WSPs required. Moreover, months after the registered representative began trading in the customer’s account, McGrath instructed the registered representative to curtail the short-term trading in the account and hold positions for a longer period; that was the only time McGrath spoke to the registered representative about the customer’s account. Furthermore, McGrath reduced the registered representative’s commissions for purchases in the customer’s account, but this measure did not have the desired impact; the registered representative actually increased the number of purchases and frequency of short-term trading to offset the effects of the commission reduction until the customer closed the account after suffering losses of approximately $120,000.

McGrath failed to take any action against the registered representative based on his failure to comply with his instructions; among other things, McGrath never restricted the trading in the customer’s account, spoke to the customer, placed the registered representative on heightened supervision, recommended disciplinary measures against him to address these concerns, or spoke with the firm’s compliance department regarding the supervision of the registered representative. The firm allowed the registered representative to effect transactions in the customer’s account for months without obtaining a signed and completed new account form from the customer, and failed to enforce its review of active accounts as the WSPs required. The firm failed to send a required suitability questionnaire to the customer until almost a year after the account had been opened and suffered significant losses, failed to qualify his account as suitable for active trading and failed to perform a timely quarterly review of the account.

J.P. Turner & Company, LLC: Censured; Fined $20,000

James Edward McGrath (Principal): Fined $5,000; Suspended 10 business days in Principal capacity only

Howard recommended that a customer have her trust purchase a $500,000 variable annuity that would make payments to her heirs. 

Purportedly, the purchase of the $500,000 annuity, issued by an insurance company, would provide the customer’s heirs with a monthly income until a certain age. The customer advised Howard that she owned rural real estate, which was held in the trust, and she believed that the property could be sold following her death realizing sale proceeds of approximately $600,000.

Howard arranged for the trust to borrow $500,000 from a bank using the real estate as collateral for the loan and using the proceeds to purchase the variable annuity. The trust had to encumber virtually all of its major assets to secure the loan, including the underlying variable annuity, because the market value of the property was only $375,000. Howard received $38,526.86 in commission for his sale of the variable annuity to the customer.

FINRA found that Howard knew, or should have known, that the cost of the annuity far exceeded the appraised market value of the real estate and the customer’s liquid assets, and that the customer could not pay for the variable annuity he recommended without borrowed funds secured in part by the annuity itself. Howard did not have a reasonable basis for believing that his recommendation was suitable for the customer in light of her financial circumstances and needs; Howard’s recommendation exceeded the customer’s financial capability and exposed her to material risk. In addition, Howard completed the account documents and paperwork for the customer’s purchase of the variable annuity, including the variable annuity questionnaire, with false information about the trust’s net worth and source of funds.  Further, he provided the completed questionnaire containing the false information about the trust’s financial situation to his member firm, and the firm retained the document in its records. Moreover, in reviewing and approving the annuity sale, Howard’s supervisor reviewed the variable annuity questionnaire; Howard thus caused the firm’s books and records to be inaccurate and impeded supervision of the annuity sale.

Krasner made unsuitable recommendations to a customer who was a retiree and inexperienced investor. 

Although the customer agreed to each of Krasner’s recommendations, Krasner employed a trading strategy that was not suitable for the customer’s particular financial situation. The customer had indicated in account opening documents that he had an investment objective of capital preservation and a low risk tolerance. 

Krasner recommended the use of margin to execute trades in the customer’s account and at times exposed the customer to inappropriate financial risk. Krasner never read the customer’s account opening documents, though they were available to him, and was unaware of the customer’s financial situation and risk tolerance, as stated in the account opening documents.

Krasner’s member firm’s database and computer platform that he used to place trades, as well as the account statements that were mailed to the customer each month, inaccurately indicated that the investment objective was speculation.  In his conversations with the customer, Krasner never confirmed the accuracy of the investment objective. Krasner employed a short-term and speculative trading strategy of short selling stock and using margin. Since Krasner was not fully aware of the customer’s stated financial condition, he based his recommendations on the erroneous view that the customer could absorb the high risks of these transactions. 

The customer frequently spoke with Krasner on the phone, gave Krasner express permission to execute the recommended trades and informed Krasner that he was willing to engage in some speculation. Furthermore, Krasner based his recommendations on his conversations with the customer and the firm’s inaccurate database, not the accurate financial information that was contained in the account opening documents. 

Krasner executed solicited trades in the customer’s account, while charging the account $51,790 in commissions and fees. Although several of the individual trades were profitable, including commissions, the customer’s account lost $54,160 in net value, dropping from a net equity value of $162,571 to $108,410.

The Firm failed to have reasonable grounds to believe that private placements offered by two entities pursuant to Regulation D were suitable for any customer.

The Firm began selling the offerings for one entity after its representatives visited the issuer’s offices to review records and meet with the issuers’ executives; the firm also received numerous third-party due diligence reports for these offerings but never obtained financial information about the entity and its offerings from independent sources, such as audited financial statements.

Despite the issuer’s assurances, the problems with its Regulation D offerings continued; the issuer repeatedly stated to the firm’s representatives that the interest and principal payments would occur within a few weeks, and the issuer made some interest payments but failed to pay substantial amounts of interest and principal owed to its investors, and these unfulfilled promises continued until the SEC filed its civil action and the issuer’s operations ceased.

In addition to ongoing delays in making payments to its investors, the firm received other red flags relating to the entity’s problems but continued to allow its brokers to sell the offering to their customers; in total, the firm’s brokers sold $11,759,798.01 of the offering to customers.

Despite the fact that the firm received numerous third-party due diligence reports for the other entities’ offering, it never obtained financial information about the issuer and its offerings from independent sources, such as audited financial statements, and although it received a specific fee related to due diligence purportedly performed in connection with each offering, the firm performed little due diligence beyond reviewing the private placement memoranda (PPM) for the issuer’s offerings. The firm’s representatives did not travel to the entity’s headquarters to conduct any due diligence for these offerings in person and did not see or request any financial information for the entity other than that contained in the PPM.

The Firm obtained a third-party due diligence report for one of the offerings after having sold these offerings for several months already; this report identified a number of red flags with respect to the offerings. Moreover, the firm should have been particularly careful to scrutinize each of the issuer’s offerings given the purported high rates of return but did not take the necessary steps, through obtaining financial information or otherwise, to ensure that these rates of return were legitimate, and not payable from the proceeds of later offerings, in the manner of a Ponzi scheme. Furthermore, the firm also did not follow up on the red flags documented in the third-party due diligence report; even with notice of these red flags, the firm continued to sell the offerings without conducting any meaningful due diligence.

The Firm failed to have reasonable grounds for approving the sale and allowing the continued sale of the offerings; even though the firm was aware of numerous red flags and negative information that should have alerted it to potential risks, the firm allowed its brokers to continue selling these private placements.The firm did not conduct meaningful due diligence for the offerings prior to approving them for sale to its customers; without adequate due diligence, the firm could not identify and understand the inherent risks of these offerings.The Firm failed to enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to detect or address potential red flags and negative information as it related to these private placements; the firm therefore failed to maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations.

Pletscher exercised discretion in customer accounts despite the fact that his member firm’s WSPs strictly prohibited discretionary trading in customer accounts, and he was aware of this prohibition.

The firm required that its registered representatives place trade orders immediately after receiving the customer’s authorization for trades, but at times Pletscher received oral authorization from customers to place trades in their accounts, yet he waited several weeks or months before placing the trades.

Pletscher requested to have variable annuity holdings for customers transferred into money market accounts without the customers’ authorization.  The customers requested the unauthorized transactions be reversed, causing his firm to incur reversal fees of $8,863.37.

Pletscher’s firm required its customers review and sign transaction related forms, but Pletscher instructed customers to provide transaction forms that contained only the customers’ signatures, which Pletscher later completed and submitted to the firm for processing, despite his firm prohibiting him from accepting incomplete forms from customers. Pletscher knew that by allowing his customers to pre-sign blank forms, he failed to ensure that customers had properly reviewed and understood the agreements they had signed. In addition, Pletscher caused the firm’s books and records to be false and misleading and to appear that the customers had agreed to the terms of each form on the date the forms were signed in blank.

 Rosas wrongfully converted a customer’s funds totaling $14,000 for his personal use by submitting withdrawal requests he forged to his member firm and an annuity company without the customer’s knowledge or consent. Rosas completed and forged other customers’ signatures on variable annuity withdrawal forms and submitted them to annuity companies, without the customers’ knowledge or consent, in an effort to convert funds totaling $45,000 from the customers’ variable annuity accounts for his personal use. 

As indicated on these forms, the funds were to be made payable to a limited liability company for which Rosas was the president and CEO. One of the annuity companies cancelled the withdrawal requests and the other annuity company placed stop payments on the checks that were issued.

Goel placed a customer’s signature on statements he prepared in connection with providing a rationale for his recommendations that the customer sell mutual funds and invest the proceeds in an equity-indexed annuity and a variable annuity, without the customer’s knowledge, authorization or consent.

Unbeknownst to Goel, the firm did not require a customer’s signature on the registered representative’s statement of rationale.

Brewer failed to adequately supervise a registered representative’s variable annuity sales activities.

Brewer personally reviewed and approved variable annuity switches of the registered representative’s customers despite the misstatements and omissions on the switch forms and numerous red flags revealing that the transactions were unsuitable. After becoming aware of the inaccurate information and omissions contained in the forms the registered representative submitted, Brewer did not require that all of the deficiencies be corrected on his member firm’s books and records and that customers be presented with forms that were completely accurate. At no time did Brewer take any action to reverse the transactions the registered representative had already effected, nor did he take any actions to prevent the registered representative from completing additional unsuitable switches.

Brewer was responsible for replying to the audit reports and implementing adequate systems and procedures relating to the supervision of variable annuities at his firm; although he was made aware of issues in the variable annuities sales review process cited by the firm’s Audit Division, he failed to take adequate steps to correct the identified failings. Brewer failed to maintain an adequate system of supervision and follow-up review, and failed to maintain and enforce written procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations and FINRA rules in connection with the sale of variable annuities.

 Holody sold equity-indexed annuities (EIAs) to individuals, through insurance companies, with investments totaling approximately $1,002,555, without providing prompt written notice to his member firm; none of these individuals were customers of his firm. Holody received commissions of approximately $79,594.34 from these sales.

The firm prohibited its representatives from selling EIAs not on the firm’s approved product list; the annuities Holody sold were not on the approved product list and his acceptance of compensation for the sales constituted engaging in an outside business activity.

Holody recommended that a retired individual liquidate some variable annuity contracts and transfer the proceeds to purchase an EIA an insurance corporation issued. Holody processed all of the paperwork on the individual’s behalf to effect the variable annuity contract liquidations to purchase the EIA contract, and the insurance corporation issued a nine-year term EIA contract in the approximate amount of $253,997.37. As a result of these transactions, the individual lost approximately $49,604 in enhanced guaranteed death benefits available under the variable annuity contracts that the individual could never recover. In addition,the insurance corporation EIA contract was also not beneficial to the individual since the variable annuity contracts offered the individual other more favorable features. Moreover, based on the individual’s disclosed investment objectives of guaranteed returns on his retirement assets and to provide for his beneficiaries, and the individual’s financial situation and needs, Holody lacked reasonable grounds to believe that liquidating the variable annuities to generate funds for the purchase of the EIA contract was suitable for the individual.

Kimberly and Richard Morrison engaged in outside business activities without providing their member firm with written notice of their outside business activities. For nearly three years, Richard Morrison was the agent for transactions in annuities, which his firm had not approved for sale, that he sold through an insurance agency. In connection with these transactions, Richard Morrison met with customers, recommended that the customers purchase the annuities, completed and signed transaction paperwork and earned approximately $425,000 in commissions.

Richard Morrison failed to disclose the outside activities to his firm on annual questionnaires and actively concealed his outside business activities from his firm.

Richard Morrison had employees of the insurance agency sign paperwork effecting the exchanges; in each of these instances, he signed and was identified as the agent of record on the application that was sent to the insurance company that issued the new policy that was purchased. The insurance agency employees signed the exchange request forms that were sent to Richard Morrison’s firm instructing it to surrender a policy and forward the proceeds for the purchase of a new policy; as a result, his firm did not see that he had recommended and was the agent for the transactions.

In addition, for nearly two years, Kimberly Morrison was listed as the agent for transactions in annuities that took place away from her firm. Moreover, in connection with these transactions, Kimberly Morrison telephoned customers to solicit them to meet with Richard Morrison and/or herself, accompanied Richard Morrison to some meetings with customers, and completed and signed transaction paperwork as the agent of record. Furthermore, the insurance agency paid Kimberly Morrison $7,483.53 in commissions on the transactions; she did not notify her firm of her involvement in any of the transactions, and did not disclose them in her firm’s annual broker questionnaire. 

Richard Thomas Morrison (Principal): Barred

Kimberly Ann Morrison: Fined $10,000; Suspended 1 year

Tang opened an account at his member firm on customers’ behalf based upon the representations of a registered representative at another FINRA member firm, although Tang never met or spoke directly with the customers.  Instead, all of Tang’s communications with the customers were through the registered representative.

Tang caused a variable annuity, in the amount of $532,874.02, to be purchased in the customers’ account based upon an order from the registered representative, for which Tang received $28,775.20 in net commission for the transaction but his firm never granted him authority to place third-party orders in the customers’ account.

Tang failed to notify his firm that a third-party placed a variable annuity order and failed to obtain the firm’s approval to cause this third-party order to be executed in the customers’ account.

Murillo recommended and effected excessive transactions in a customer’s account that were unsuitable in light of the customer’s financial situation, needs and investment objectives.

Murillo controlled and directed the trading in the customer’s account by recommending and executing all the transactions in the account. The customer was unable to evaluate Murillo’s recommendations, did not understand the meaning of “margin,” and was unable to exercise independent judgment concerning the transactions in the account due to his lack of investment knowledge and limited English skills; the customer trusted Murillo completely to make and execute recommendations in his account.

Murillo did not have a reasonable basis for believing that the volume of trading he recommended was suitable for the customer in light of information he knew about the customer’s financial circumstances and needs, and given the amount of commissions and fees the customer was charged; and as a result, the transactions Murillo recommended and executed were unsuitable, even if the investment objectives were speculative as reflected on the customer’s new account form. The customer told Murillo that he wanted a conservative retirement account set up because he was nearing retirement age and could not risk any losses with his funds; nevertheless, the new account forms listed the customer’s investment objective as speculation and his risk tolerance as aggressive.

The trades were excessive in number and resulted in excessive costs to the customer’s account, and the vast majority of the transactions in the customer’s account were effected through the use of margin and resulted in the customer incurring additional costs in the form of margin interest. In addition, Although the customer signed a pre-completed margin agreement, along with other pre-completed new account forms Murillo sent to him, the customer did not understand margin and did not realize that Murillo was effecting trades on his account on margin. Moreover, owing to the customer’s lack of investment knowledge and inability to decipher his monthly account statements, the customer was unaware that he had a margin balance and did not understand the risk of the margin exposure in his account; at one point, the customer’s account had a margin balance of approximately $106,818.52 while the account’s equity was approximately $67,479.98. The transactions on margin Murillo effected in the customer’s account were unsuitable for the customer in view of the size and nature of the account and the customer’s financial situation and needs.

Tieger  convinced his junior partner to call an annuity company and impersonate his relative for the purpose of confirming a $275,000 withdrawal from one of the relative’s variable annuity contracts.

The relative attempted to make a distribution from his variable annuity and after growing frustrated with the withdrawal process, instructed Tieger to take care of it. After multiple requests, Tieger’s junior partner agreed to make the telephone call using the relative’s cellular phone, spoke to the annuity company representative and, pretending to be Tieger’s relative, asked the representative to process the contract withdrawal. The junior partner answered the representative’s questions by reading from a script that Tieger had prepared.  Tieger watched the junior partner’s call from outside a glass conference room.

After Tieger left the office building, the junior partner called the representative back to inform him that he was not the relative and that he had called because someone standing next to him asked him to impersonate the relative.

National Securities failed to have reasonable grounds to believe that certain private placements offered pursuant to Regulation D were suitable for customers. Acting through Portes, as the firm’s Director of Alternative Investments/Director of Syndications, National failed to adequately enforce its supervisory procedures to conduct adequate due diligence as it relates to an offering. Portes and the firm became aware of multiple red flags regarding an offering, including liquidity concerns, missed interest payments and defaults, that should have put them on notice of possible problems, but the firm continued to sell the offering to customers. Acting through Portes, the Firm failed to enforce its supervisory procedures to conduct adequate due diligence relating to other offerings.

Portes reviewed the PPMs for these offerings and diligence reports others prepared, but the review was cursory.The due diligence reports noted significant risks and specifically provided that its conclusions were conditioned upon recommendations regarding guidelines, changes in the PPMs and heightened financial disclosure of affiliated party advances, but the firm did not investigate, follow up on or discuss any of these potential conflicts or risks with either the issuer or any third party. In addition, acting through Portes, the Firm failed to enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to detect or address potential “red flags” as related to these offerings; and the firm, acting through Portes, failed to maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations.

National Securities Corporation: Censured; Odered to pay a total of $175,000 in restitution to investors.

Matthew G. Portes  (Principal): Fned $10,000; Suspended from association with any FINRA member in any principal capacity only for 6 months.

Mahler improperly created answer keys to state insurance continuing education (CE) exams a company administered.

The company’s president approached Mahler on different occasions and offered to provide him with answers to the company’s CE exams. The president provided Mahler with the answers to the CE exams over the phone or by handing copies of the answers to Mahler, and Mahler used these answers to create answer keys for the exams.

Mahler improperly distributed the answer keys to an employee at his member firm and to multiple registered representatives outside of his firm. On multiple occasions, while he was an external wholesaler, Mahler provided assistance to non-firm registered representatives while they were taking a state annuity examination for CE credit. Mahler was in the offices of some registered representatives while they were taking the annuity examination; some of these registered representatives asked Mahler to give them the answers to certain of the questions on the examination, which Mahler provided.

Mahler failed to supervise in that he gave one direct report answer keys to state insurance CE exams.

Chima engaged in a pattern of unsuitable short-term trading and switching of unit investment trusts (UITs), closed-end funds (CEFs) and mutual funds in retired and/or disabled customer accounts without having reasonable grounds for believing that such transactions were suitable for the customers in view of the nature, frequency and size of the recommended transactions and in light of their financial situations, investment objectives, circumstances and needs. Some of the transactions were effected through excessive use of margin and without ensuring that customers received the maximum sales charge discount. In furtherance of his short-term trading strategy, Chima engaged in discretionary trading without prior written authorization, falsified customer account update documents and mismarked trade tickets for each of the customers’ accounts, stating that the orders were unsolicited when, in fact, they were solicited.

The transactions generated approximately $450,000 in commissions for Chima and his firm, and approximately $370,000 in losses to the customers; some customers also paid over $75,000 in margin interest. In numerous UIT purchases, none of which exceeded $250,000, Chima failed to apply the rollover discount to which each customer was entitled.

Chima caused his member firm’s books and records to be false in material respects, in that he provided false information on customer update forms for customers’ accounts, signed the forms certifying that they were accurate and submitted them to his firm.

Gould converted more than $1,315,000 from customers who had purchased annuities from him by, among other deceptive means and devices, convincing his customers to sign blank annuity withdrawal request forms, which he subsequently completed with instructions to the insurance companies to transfer his customers’ funds to a bank account held in the name of a company he owned and controlled. In some instances, the withdrawal request forms contained a medallion signature guarantee that he improperly obtained.

Gould converted funds from other annuity customers by using withdrawal request forms that contained customers’ signatures to direct insurance companies to transfer funds from the customers’ annuities to his bank account. Gould unlawfully converted customer funds from customers’ brokerage accounts by, among other deceptive means and devices, improperly transferring funds from their brokerage accounts to the bank account he owned and controlled. The customers either did not authorize or were not aware of the conversion resulting from the transfer of funds from their annuities and brokerage accounts to Gould’s bank account.

Gould used the unlawfully converted funds to pay for his own personal and business expenses; none of the customers were aware he was withdrawing funds for his personal use. On numerous occasions, Gould falsified documents to make it appear that customers had authorized the transfer of funds from their annuities and brokerage accounts to his bank account, and in some instances, effectuated these transfers by convincing customers to sign withdrawal request forms, some of which were blank.

In connection with the sale of investments in a film production company, Flowers made fraudulent misrepresentations and omitted to disclose material information. Flowers collected at least $92,000 from investors, falsely representing that he would use their funds to finance a film production business and promising exorbitant, guaranteed returns. Instead of investing the funds, Flowers misused $30,498 to repay other investors and pay for personal expenses without the investors’ knowledge, consent or authorization.

Flowers made recommendations to a customer to invest in private placement offerings that were unsuitable in light of the customer’s financial situation, investment objective and financial needs.

Flowers attempted to settle away customers’ complaints without his member firm’s knowledge or consent.

Flowers signed an attestation form for a firm acknowledging that email communications with the public must be sent through the firm’s email address and copied to the compliance department, but Flowers communicated with customers via unapproved, outside email accounts without his member firms’ knowledge or consent, and as a result of his outside communications, his member firms were unable to review his emails to firm customers. In addition, Flowers engaged in private securities transactions without providing prior written notice to, and receiving prior written approval from, his member firms.

The Firm failed to:

• have reasonable grounds to believe that a private placement an entity offered pursuant to Regulation D was suitable for any customer, after it received red flags that the entity had financial issues and was not timely making interest payments, but continued to sell the offering to customers;
• enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and NASD and FINRA rules in connection with the sale of private placements;
• conduct adequate due diligence of the private placements or confirm that its representatives were doing their own due diligence;
• conduct adequate due diligence of private placements other entities offered; and
• enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and NASD and FINRA rules in connection with the sale of the private placements the entities offered pursuant to Regulation D.

The Firm reviewed cursory private placement memoranda (PPMs) for the offerings but failed to investigate red flags or analyze third-party sources of information or take affirmative steps to ensure the information in the offering documents was accurate.

The Firm failed to preserve electronic communications in a non-rewritable, non-erasable or “WORM” format that complied with books and records requirements, and the firm used third-party software for storing and retaining electronic communications that did not comply with the requirements of SEC Rule 17a-4(f). Although the Firm was informed that its electronic storage medium was non-compliant but did not take adequate remedial action to retain email properly.

The Firm entered into an agreement with an entity to sell a private placement for which the firm’s brokers sold $1,415,940 of the private placement interests to customers, and the firm failed to create and maintain a reasonable supervisory system to detect and prevent sales practice violations in these transactions. The firm did not collect financial and other relevant information for the customers who purchased the private placement, and did not review these transactions to determine if the recommendations for the purchases were suitable for these customers.

Also, the firm failed to implement a supervisory system reasonably designed to review and retain electronic correspondence. The firm did not establish an email retention system that captured all of its brokers’ emails. The firm’s brokers were allowed to use email addresses using external domains, and the firm did not have the capability to review, capture and retain these emails.

Fulton submitted a variable annuity application and other documents to his member firm knowing that they contained falsified customer signatures. Fulton recommended that a customer switch a variable annuity he owned for another variable annuity, which had advantageous riders. The customer agreed to the switch, but Fulton agreed to delay the switch until market conditions improved.

Fulton determined that market conditions were appropriate for the switch on a certain date, but the customer was out of town on an extended trip at that time. Fulton and the customer then agreed that the customer’s relative would sign the customer’s name to the variable annuity application and the other documents necessary to complete the switch transaction, which she did with Fulton’s knowledge. Fulton then submitted the annuity application and other documents the relative falsely signed to his firm as authentic, knowing that the customer’s signature on the documents was not authentic. In addition, Fulton’s submission of the falsified application and other documents to his firm caused the firm’s books and records to be inaccurate.

Cohen violated FINRA’s suitability rule by failing to understand or convey to customers the cost of a rider to a variable annuity, pursuant to transactions he recommended to customers. Cohen incorrectly communicated the imposed fee. Cohen did not understand the risks and rewards inherent in the variable annuity, with the rider feature, which he recommended to the customers.

Cohen conducted a trade in a deceased customer’s account with a purchase of $4,662 of an entity Class A mutual fund share. Cohen had discussed with this customer purchasing the entity’s Class A shares prior to the customer’s passing, and he had prepared certain paperwork for the transaction prior to the customer’s death, but the purchase had not been made at the time of the customer’s death. At the time of the transaction, Cohen did not consult with any representative of the deceased customer’s estate and also did not notify the firm that the customer had passed away.

In addition, Cohen failed to appear for a FINRA on-the-record interview.

Gibas failed to reasonably supervise a registered representative at his member firm by approving variable annuity transactions the representative recommended and affected; in approving these transactions, Gibas did not adequately respond to red flags that should have alerted him that the transactions were unsuitable.

Gibas’ firm placed the representative under heightened supervision, which was formalized by a written agreement the representative and Gibas signed, and under the agreement, Gibas was required, among of things, to pre-approve all the representative’s annuity business and new accounts, to speak with each of the representative’s customers who were 65 or older, and to help the representative diversify her business.

With respect to the variable annuity transactions, they were unsuitable, in that the transactions’ costs outweighed the benefits, and in some of those transactions, the customers purchased a rider for which they were not eligible. At the time Gibas approved these transactions, there were numerous red flags regarding the representative’s variable annuity transactions, including transactions appearing on exception reports, that should have alerted him to the potential unsuitability of her transactions and required follow-up more comprehensive than Gibas otherwise took. Gibas did not adequately carry out his other responsibilities under the firm’s heightened supervision of the representative; although Gibas reviewed the representative’s transactions and contacted certain elderly customers before those transactions were affected, some of the conversations with the representative’s customers lasted only a few minutes, were conducted when the representative was present, or before Gibas received any paperwork regarding the proposed transaction. While Gibas met with the representative, as well as with other supervisory and compliance personnel at the firm, none of the steps taken proved effective in preventing the representative’s unsuitable sales.

Bulinski made unsuitable recommendations to her elderly clients to purchase variable annuities. She repeatedly failed to tailor her recommendations to meet her customers’ individual investment needs, and instead recommended the same variable annuity to her customers, irrespective of age, investment experience, liquidity needs, financial situation and risk tolerance.

Bulinski recommended that elderly customers purchase the same variable annuity with an enhanced death benefit rider, but demonstrated that she did not have reasonable basis for her recommendation because some of the customers were too old to purchase the rider and the rest gained little, if any, benefit from the rider while paying a substantial cost for it. Bulinski recommended unsuitable variable annuities with a rider that was inconsistent with her customers’ investment objectives. In numerous instances, Bulinski demonstrated that she did not understand the variable annuity and inaccurately described the investment to a customer as a fixed annuity rather than a variable annuity, and with other customers, incorrectly stated the surrender period and surrender charges her customers would incur.

Bulinski was the subject of several written customer complaints about her lack of disclosure about surrender charges and other product details.

Buchholz misappropriated approximately $1,350,000 from customers, a number of whom were retirees, by liquidating their variable annuities and/or mutual funds and then transferring the proceeds to his personal bank account, converting the proceeds for his own use and benefit. As part of this scheme, Buchholz falsely and fraudulently represented, at times by forging customer signatures on redemption documents, that certain customers had authorized the redemption of the securities in order to obtain the proceeds of the sale; fraudulently induced certain customers to authorize the redemption of securities, based on misrepresentations that the proceeds would be reinvested to the customers’ investment accounts; and caused checks to be drawn in the customers’ names and caused the checks to be sent directly either to his office or to the customers.

If the checks were sent directly

• to the customers, Buchholz convinced those clients to turn the checks over to him, making false and fraudulent representations that he would deposit the funds in their securities accounts to be reinvested; however, he did not reinvest the proceeds but instead deposited the checks into his personal bank accounts and used the proceeds for his own purpose;
• to his office, Buchholz simply deposited the checks in his own bank accounts for his personal use and sometimes forged the customers’ signatures in order to cash the checks.

Beckett submitted an advertisement to a local newspaper, which listed an entity he owned as offering certain investments, including certificates of deposit (CDs) and fixed annuities, and that he did not submit the advertisement to his member firm for review and approval; moreover, the advertisement content included misleading statements regarding the offered investments.

Beckett maintained a website for an entity he owned, which was accessible to the investing public, and he failed to submit the website material to his firm for review until a later date. Beckett failed to obtain his firm’s written approval of the website content prior to its use.

Beckett completed an annual certification, which he provided to his firm and he answered “no” to the question asking whether he anticipated using any type of electronic communication systems such as the Internet for soliciting business.

The Firm approved advertising materials registered representatives used during several public seminars; the firm sent invitations to members of the public, and the seminar attendees received supplemental materials designed to introduce the firm and the financial services it offered. The invitations failed to provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts regarding the products or services offered. The supplemental materials contained exaggerated and unwarranted language, and the seminar handout had unwarranted language.

The seminar presentations failed to explain a product or strategy.  The discussion of equity-indexed annuities (EIAs) failed to provide a balanced presentation and omitted information.  The discussion of variable annuities omitted material information.

The presentations failed to disclose

• that projections are hypothetical and are not guarantees,
• risks attendant with options transactions, and
• risks and rewards of real estate investment trusts (REITs) in a balanced way.

The discussion of expenses pertaining to mutual funds and variable annuities was misleading; discussion of annuities in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) was misleading.

The list of benefits and features of variable annuities failed to disclose potential restrictions and costs, discussion of 1031 exchanges failed to elaborate on Internal Revenue Code restrictions. The discussion of variable annuities provided an incomplete, and oversimplified presentation and representation that safety and protection are provided by diversification market index certificates of deposit, puts, and living benefits profits provided by variable annuities was promissory and exaggerated.

The firm failed to reasonably supervise its communications with the public and its supervision was not reasonably designed to meet the requirements of FINRA Rule 2210(b)(2). The firm’s procedures required the supervisory principal to evidence approval by signing public communications submitted for approval and use, but the supervisory principal only initialed a coversheet that did not identify which communication was approved. In addition, the firm failed to maintain records naming the registered principal who approved the public communication or the date approval was given, nor documentation establishing that a certified registered options principal approved options material or that the material had been properly submitted to FINRA’s Advertising Regulation Department for pre-approval.

Ware introduced several customers to a Stock to Cash program under which customers would pledge stock to obtain loans to purchase other products. Ware recommended a customer participate in the program under which the customer obtained loans of approximately $388,000 and pledged securities in support of these loans, using the proceeds to purchase fixed annuities through Ware.

Ware failed to conduct adequate due diligence concerning the operations or financial stability of the Stock to Cash program lender and failed to take sufficient action to determine whether his clients’ ownership interest in the pledged securities was adequately protected. Ware did not understand the potential risks inherent in the program and therefore did not have a reasonable basis for his recommendations.

Cambridge failed to have reasonable grounds to believe that a private placement offered pursuant to Regulation D was suitable for any customer.

Acting through Fincher, its Chief Compliance Officer and registered principal, the Firm failed to

• conduct adequate due diligence of the private placement offering before allowing its brokers to sell the security,
• maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and
• enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to detect or address potential red flags as it related to the offering.

Fincher was the principal responsible for conducting due diligence on the offering and approved the security as a new product available for firm brokers to sell to their customers; he allowed the firm’s brokers to continue selling the security despite its ongoing failure to make overdue interest and principal payments. The Firm failed to have reasonable grounds for allowing the continued sale of the security even though the firm, through Fincher, was aware of numerous red flags concerning liquidity problems, delinquencies and defaults, but allowed its brokers to continue selling the security.

Cambridge Legacy Securities, L.L.C.:Censured; Ordered to pay $218,400 in restitution to customers. If the firm fails to provide FINRA with proof of restitution, it shall immediately be suspended from FINRA membership until such proof has been provided.

Tommy Edward Fincher: Fined $5,000; Suspended 6 months in Principal capacity only.

NEXT Financial Group did not have a reasonable system for reviewing its registered representatives’ transactions for excessive trading. The firm relied upon its OSJ branch managers to review its registered representatives’ transactions and home office compliance personnel to review its OSJ branch managers’ transactions, but the firm failed to utilize exception reports or another system, and the supervisors and compliance personnel only reviewed transactions on weekly paper blotters or electronic blotters.

The monthly account statements and contingent deferred sales charge reports for mutual fund activity were also available for review and could be indicators of excessive trading, however, given the volume of trading certain principals reviewed, and in certain cases, the large number of representatives for which the principal was responsible, it was not reasonable to expect principals to be able to track excessive trading on a weekly sales blotter, let alone through monthly account statements or mutual fund sales charge reports.

Due to the lack of a reasonable supervisory system, the firm failed to detect a registered representative’s excessive trading, which resulted in about $102,376 in unnecessary sales charges; the firm failed to identify or follow up on other transactions that suggested other registered representatives’ excessive trading in additional customer accounts. 

The Firm did not have a reasonable system for ensuring that it obtained and documented principal review of its registered representatives’ transactions, including sales of complicated products such as variable annuities, and the firm should have been particularly attentive to maintaining books and records that established that the transactions had been properly reviewed. The firm failed to provide reasonable supervision of municipal bond markups and markdowns to ensure that its registered representatives charged its customers reasonable markups and markdowns. In addition,  the firm’s branch office examination program was unreasonable because it was not designed to carry out its intended purpose of detecting and preventing violations of, and achieving compliance with, federal, state and FINRA securities regulations, as well as its own policies.

The firm failed to have a reasonable supervisory system to oversee implementation of its heightened supervision policies and procedures for its registered representatives as it failed to comply with the terms of its heightened supervision for its registered representatives regarding client complaints, regulatory actions or internal reviews, therefore it had a deficient implementation of heightened supervision policies and procedures.

The firm failed to have a reasonable supervisory control system or to have in place Supervisory Control Procedures as required by FINRA Rule 3012, and it failed to perform adequate 3012 testing or prepare adequate 3012 reports. Moreover,the firm failed to have a reasonable system and procedures in place to review and approve investment advisors’ private securities transactions.

Furthermore, the firm filed inaccurate and late Rule 3070 reports relevant to customer complaints, and did not file or amend Form U4 and Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U5) reports in a timely manner.

The Firm's AML systems and procedures were unreasonable, as the firm failed to establish and implement an AML Compliance Program reasonably designed to achieve compliance with NASD Rule 3011. Although the firm utilized a money movement report, its supervisors did not detect red flags involving numerous instances of potentially suspicious activities relating to the trading of a company’s stock and the transfers of proceeds relating to the trading of a stock, and thus failed to investigate and report these activities in accordance with its own procedures and the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and the implementing regulations.

In addition, over 1.3 million shares of a company’s stock were traded in customer accounts a registered representative serviced; during a one-week period, the firm’s only AML exception report that monitored large money movement flagged the customer’s account, but the firm took no action and failed to file any SARs as appropriate.