AWC/2009020124301/December 2011
AWC/2011026619801/November 2011
Meyer verbally informed his supervisors of his outside business activities and his business plans, but failed to provide his firm with prompt written notice of his outside business activities, for which he accepted compensation. Without his relative’s knowledge, Meyer conducted subaccount transfers, or transactions, in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) the relative held to his personal account, which held only a variable annuity contract. The annuity sub-account transactions reduced the value of the variable annuity contract by $1,395.15 by the time the account was formally transferred to his relative.
Meyer transferred $1,800 from the relative’s IRA to his personal bank account. The firm immediately reversed the transaction as well as reimbursed Meyer’s relative $1,395.15 for the account’s reduction in value caused by Meyer’s transactions. Meyer has made full restitution to the firm.
OS/2008012282901/November 2011
Howard recommended that a customer have her trust purchase a $500,000 variable annuity that would make payments to her heirs.
Purportedly, the purchase of the $500,000 annuity, issued by an insurance company, would provide the customer’s heirs with a monthly income until a certain age. The customer advised Howard that she owned rural real estate, which was held in the trust, and she believed that the property could be sold following her death realizing sale proceeds of approximately $600,000.
Howard arranged for the
trust to borrow $500,000 from a bank using the real estate as collateral for
the loan and using the proceeds to purchase the variable annuity. The trust had
to encumber virtually all of its major assets to secure the loan, including the
underlying variable annuity, because the market value of the property was only
$375,000. Howard received $38,526.86 in
commission for his sale of the variable annuity to the customer.
FINRA found that Howard knew, or should have known, that the cost of the annuity far exceeded the appraised market value of the real estate and the customer’s liquid assets, and that the customer could not pay for the variable annuity he recommended without borrowed funds secured in part by the annuity itself. Howard did not have a reasonable basis for believing that his recommendation was suitable for the customer in light of her financial circumstances and needs; Howard’s recommendation exceeded the customer’s financial capability and exposed her to material risk. In addition, Howard completed the account documents and paperwork for the customer’s purchase of the variable annuity, including the variable annuity questionnaire, with false information about the trust’s net worth and source of funds. Further, he provided the completed questionnaire containing the false information about the trust’s financial situation to his member firm, and the firm retained the document in its records. Moreover, in reviewing and approving the annuity sale, Howard’s supervisor reviewed the variable annuity questionnaire; Howard thus caused the firm’s books and records to be inaccurate and impeded supervision of the annuity sale.
AWC/2010024396001/October 2011
Rosas wrongfully converted a customer’s funds totaling $14,000 for his personal use by submitting withdrawal requests he forged to his member firm and an annuity company without the customer’s knowledge or consent. Rosas completed and forged other customers’ signatures on variable annuity withdrawal forms and submitted them to annuity companies, without the customers’ knowledge or consent, in an effort to convert funds totaling $45,000 from the customers’ variable annuity accounts for his personal use.
As indicated on these forms, the funds were to be made payable to a limited liability company for which Rosas was the president and CEO. One of the annuity companies cancelled the withdrawal requests and the other annuity company placed stop payments on the checks that were issued.
OS/2005002244102/September 2011
Brewer failed to adequately supervise a registered representative’s variable annuity sales activities.
Brewer personally reviewed and approved variable annuity switches of the registered representative’s customers despite the misstatements and omissions on the switch forms and numerous red flags revealing that the transactions were unsuitable. After becoming aware of the inaccurate information and omissions contained in the forms the registered representative submitted, Brewer did not require that all of the deficiencies be corrected on his member firm’s books and records and that customers be presented with forms that were completely accurate. At no time did Brewer take any action to reverse the transactions the registered representative had already effected, nor did he take any actions to prevent the registered representative from completing additional unsuitable switches.
Brewer was responsible for replying to the audit reports and implementing adequate systems and procedures relating to the supervision of variable annuities at his firm; although he was made aware of issues in the variable annuities sales review process cited by the firm’s Audit Division, he failed to take adequate steps to correct the identified failings. Brewer failed to maintain an adequate system of supervision and follow-up review, and failed to maintain and enforce written procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations and FINRA rules in connection with the sale of variable annuities.
AWC/2010022152201/September 2011
Holody sold equity-indexed annuities (EIAs) to individuals, through insurance companies, with investments totaling approximately $1,002,555, without providing prompt written notice to his member firm; none of these individuals were customers of his firm. Holody received commissions of approximately $79,594.34 from these sales.
The firm prohibited its representatives from selling EIAs not on the firm’s approved product list; the annuities Holody sold were not on the approved product list and his acceptance of compensation for the sales constituted engaging in an outside business activity.
Holody recommended that a retired individual liquidate some variable annuity contracts and transfer the proceeds to purchase an EIA an insurance corporation issued. Holody processed all of the paperwork on the individual’s behalf to effect the variable annuity contract liquidations to purchase the EIA contract, and the insurance corporation issued a nine-year term EIA contract in the approximate amount of $253,997.37. As a result of these transactions, the individual lost approximately $49,604 in enhanced guaranteed death benefits available under the variable annuity contracts that the individual could never recover. In addition,the insurance corporation EIA contract was also not beneficial to the individual since the variable annuity contracts offered the individual other more favorable features. Moreover, based on the individual’s disclosed investment objectives of guaranteed returns on his retirement assets and to provide for his beneficiaries, and the individual’s financial situation and needs, Holody lacked reasonable grounds to believe that liquidating the variable annuities to generate funds for the purchase of the EIA contract was suitable for the individual.
AWC/2010021897401/September 2011
Tang opened an account at his member firm on customers’ behalf based upon the representations of a registered representative at another FINRA member firm, although Tang never met or spoke directly with the customers. Instead, all of Tang’s communications with the customers were through the registered representative.
Tang caused a variable annuity, in the amount of $532,874.02, to be purchased in the customers’ account based upon an order from the registered representative, for which Tang received $28,775.20 in net commission for the transaction but his firm never granted him authority to place third-party orders in the customers’ account.
Tang failed to notify his firm that a third-party placed a variable annuity order and failed to obtain the firm’s approval to cause this third-party order to be executed in the customers’ account.
AWC/2009018325701/July 2011
Tieger convinced his junior partner to call an annuity company and impersonate his relative for the purpose of confirming a $275,000 withdrawal from one of the relative’s variable annuity contracts.
The relative attempted to make a distribution from his variable annuity and after growing frustrated with the withdrawal process, instructed Tieger to take care of it. After multiple requests, Tieger’s junior partner agreed to make the telephone call using the relative’s cellular phone, spoke to the annuity company representative and, pretending to be Tieger’s relative, asked the representative to process the contract withdrawal. The junior partner answered the representative’s questions by reading from a script that Tieger had prepared. Tieger watched the junior partner’s call from outside a glass conference room.
After Tieger left the office building, the junior partner called the representative back to inform him that he was not the relative and that he had called because someone standing next to him asked him to impersonate the relative.
AWC/2009018041101/March 2011
Fulton submitted a variable annuity application and other documents to his member firm knowing that they contained falsified customer signatures. Fulton recommended that a customer switch a variable annuity he owned for another variable annuity, which had advantageous riders. The customer agreed to the switch, but Fulton agreed to delay the switch until market conditions improved.
Fulton determined that market conditions were appropriate for the switch on a certain date, but the customer was out of town on an extended trip at that time. Fulton and the customer then agreed that the customer’s relative would sign the customer’s name to the variable annuity application and the other documents necessary to complete the switch transaction, which she did with Fulton’s knowledge. Fulton then submitted the annuity application and other documents the relative falsely signed to his firm as authentic, knowing that the customer’s signature on the documents was not authentic. In addition, Fulton’s submission of the falsified application and other documents to his firm caused the firm’s books and records to be inaccurate.
AWC/2009017087301/February 2011
Cohen violated FINRA’s suitability rule by failing to understand or convey to customers the cost of a rider to a variable annuity, pursuant to transactions he recommended to customers. Cohen incorrectly communicated the imposed fee. Cohen did not understand the risks and rewards inherent in the variable annuity, with the rider feature, which he recommended to the customers.
Cohen conducted a trade in a deceased customer’s account with a purchase of $4,662 of an entity Class A mutual fund share. Cohen had discussed with this customer purchasing the entity’s Class A shares prior to the customer’s passing, and he had prepared certain paperwork for the transaction prior to the customer’s death, but the purchase had not been made at the time of the customer’s death. At the time of the transaction, Cohen did not consult with any representative of the deceased customer’s estate and also did not notify the firm that the customer had passed away.
In addition, Cohen failed to appear for a FINRA on-the-record interview.
AWC/2005002244703/February 2011
Gibas failed to reasonably supervise a registered representative at his member firm by approving variable annuity transactions the representative recommended and affected; in approving these transactions, Gibas did not adequately respond to red flags that should have alerted him that the transactions were unsuitable.
Gibas’ firm placed the representative under heightened supervision, which was formalized by a written agreement the representative and Gibas signed, and under the agreement, Gibas was required, among of things, to pre-approve all the representative’s annuity business and new accounts, to speak with each of the representative’s customers who were 65 or older, and to help the representative diversify her business.
With respect to the variable annuity transactions, they were unsuitable, in that the transactions’ costs outweighed the benefits, and in some of those transactions, the customers purchased a rider for which they were not eligible. At the time Gibas approved these transactions, there were numerous red flags regarding the representative’s variable annuity transactions, including transactions appearing on exception reports, that should have alerted him to the potential unsuitability of her transactions and required follow-up more comprehensive than Gibas otherwise took. Gibas did not adequately carry out his other responsibilities under the firm’s heightened supervision of the representative; although Gibas reviewed the representative’s transactions and contacted certain elderly customers before those transactions were affected, some of the conversations with the representative’s customers lasted only a few minutes, were conducted when the representative was present, or before Gibas received any paperwork regarding the proposed transaction. While Gibas met with the representative, as well as with other supervisory and compliance personnel at the firm, none of the steps taken proved effective in preventing the representative’s unsuitable sales.
AWC/2005002244704/February 2011
Bulinski made unsuitable recommendations to her elderly clients to purchase variable annuities. She repeatedly failed to tailor her recommendations to meet her customers’ individual investment needs, and instead recommended the same variable annuity to her customers, irrespective of age, investment experience, liquidity needs, financial situation and risk tolerance.
Bulinski recommended that elderly customers purchase the same variable annuity with an enhanced death benefit rider, but demonstrated that she did not have reasonable basis for her recommendation because some of the customers were too old to purchase the rider and the rest gained little, if any, benefit from the rider while paying a substantial cost for it. Bulinski recommended unsuitable variable annuities with a rider that was inconsistent with her customers’ investment objectives. In numerous instances, Bulinski demonstrated that she did not understand the variable annuity and inaccurately described the investment to a customer as a fixed annuity rather than a variable annuity, and with other customers, incorrectly stated the surrender period and surrender charges her customers would incur.
Bulinski was the subject of several written customer complaints about her lack of disclosure about surrender charges and other product details.
AWC/2009017637201/February 2011
The Firm approved advertising materials registered representatives used during several public seminars; the firm sent invitations to members of the public, and the seminar attendees received supplemental materials designed to introduce the firm and the financial services it offered. The invitations failed to provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts regarding the products or services offered. The supplemental materials contained exaggerated and unwarranted language, and the seminar handout had unwarranted language.
The seminar presentations failed to explain a product or strategy. The discussion of equity-indexed annuities (EIAs) failed to provide a balanced presentation and omitted information. The discussion of variable annuities omitted material information.
The presentations failed to disclose
- that projections are hypothetical and are not guarantees,
- risks attendant with options transactions, and
- risks and rewards of real estate investment trusts (REITs) in a balanced way.
The discussion of expenses pertaining to mutual funds and variable annuities was misleading; discussion of annuities in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) was misleading.
The list of benefits and features of variable annuities failed to disclose potential restrictions and costs, discussion of 1031 exchanges failed to elaborate on Internal Revenue Code restrictions. The discussion of variable annuities provided an incomplete, and oversimplified presentation and representation that safety and protection are provided by diversification market index certificates of deposit, puts, and living benefits profits provided by variable annuities was promissory and exaggerated.
The firm failed to reasonably supervise its communications with the public and its supervision was not reasonably designed to meet the requirements of FINRA Rule 2210(b)(2). The firm’s procedures required the supervisory principal to evidence approval by signing public communications submitted for approval and use, but the supervisory principal only initialed a coversheet that did not identify which communication was approved. In addition, the firm failed to maintain records naming the registered principal who approved the public communication or the date approval was given, nor documentation establishing that a certified registered options principal approved options material or that the material had been properly submitted to FINRA’s Advertising Regulation Department for pre-approval.
2007008935010/January 2011
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