While associated with the firm, registered representatives made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to purchasers of unsecured bridge notes and warrants to purchase common stock of a successor company.

The registered representatives:

• guaranteed customers that they would receive back their principal investment plus returns, failed to inform investors of any risks associated with the investments and did not discuss the risks outlined in the private placement memorandum (PPM) that could result in them losing their entire investment. The registered representatives had no reasonable basis for the guarantees given the description of the placement agent’s limited role in the PPM; and
• provided unwarranted price predictions to customers regarding the future price of common stock for which the warrants would be exchangeable and guaranteed the payment at maturity of promissory notes, which led customers to believe that funds raised by the sale of the anticipated private placement would be held in escrow for redemption of the promissory notes.

The Firm, acting through a registered representative, made misrepresentations and/or omissions of material fact to customers in connection with the sale of the private placement of firm units consisting of Class B common stock and warrants to purchase Class A common stock; the PPM stated that the investment was speculative, involving a high degree of risk and was only suitable for persons who could risk losing their entire investment. The representative represented to customers that he would invest their funds in another private placement and in direct contradiction, invested the funds in the firm private placement.

The Representative recommended and effected the sale of these securities without having a reasonable basis to believe that the transactions were suitable given the customers’ financial circumstances and conditions, and their investment objectives. The representative recommended customers use margin in their accounts, which was unsuitable given their risk tolerance and investment objectives, and he exercised discretion without prior written authorization in customers’ accounts.

Acting through Locy, its chief operating officer (COO) and president, the Firm failed to reasonably supervise the registered representative and failed to follow up on “red flags” that should have alerted him to the need to investigate the representative’s sales practices and determine whether trading restrictions, heightened supervision or discipline were warranted. Moreover, despite numerous red flags, the firm took no steps to contact customers or place the representative on heightened supervision, although it later placed limits only on the representative’s use of margin. The firm eventually suspended his trading authority after additional large margin calls, and Locy failed to ensure that the representative was making accurate representations and suitable recommendations.

Turbeville, the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO), and Locy delegated responsibility to Mercier, the firm’s chief compliance officer (CCO), to conduct due diligence on a company and were aware of red flags regarding its offering but did not take steps to investigate. 

Acting through Turbeville, Locy and Mercier, the Firm failed to establish, maintain and enforce supervisory procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of NASD Rule 2310 regarding suitability; under the firm’s written supervisory procedures (WSPs), Mercier was responsible for ensuring the offering complied with due diligence requirements but performed only a superficial review and failed to complete the steps required by the WSPs; Locy never evaluated the company’s financial situation and was unsure if a certified public accountant (CPA) audited the financials, and no one visited the company’s facility. Neither Turbeville nor Locy took any steps to ensure Mercier had completed the due diligence process. Turbeville and Locy created the firm’s deficient supervisory system; the firm’s procedures were inadequate to prevent and detect unsuitable recommendations resulting from excessive trading, excessive use of margin and over-concentration; principals did not review trades or correspondence; and the firm’s new account application process was flawed because a reviewing principal was unable to obtain an accurate picture of customers’ financial status, investment objectives and investment history when reviewing a transaction for suitability. The firm’s procedures failed to identify specific reports that its compliance department was to review and did not provide guidance on the actions or analysis that should occur in response to the reports; Turbeville and Locy knew, or should have known, of the compliance department’s limited reviews, but neither of them took steps to address the inadequate system.

Brookstone Securities, Inc.: Censured; Fine $200,000

David William Locy (Principal): Fined $10,000; Suspended from 3 months in Principal capacity only

Mark Mather Mercier (Principal): Fined $5,000; Suspended from 3 months in Principal capacity only

Antony Lee Turbeville (Principal): Fined $10,000; Suspended from 3 months in Principal capacity only

The Firm failed to have reasonable grounds to believe that private placements offered by two entities pursuant to Regulation D were suitable for any customer.

The Firm began selling the offerings for one entity after its representatives visited the issuer’s offices to review records and meet with the issuers’ executives; the firm also received numerous third-party due diligence reports for these offerings but never obtained financial information about the entity and its offerings from independent sources, such as audited financial statements.

Despite the issuer’s assurances, the problems with its Regulation D offerings continued; the issuer repeatedly stated to the firm’s representatives that the interest and principal payments would occur within a few weeks, and the issuer made some interest payments but failed to pay substantial amounts of interest and principal owed to its investors, and these unfulfilled promises continued until the SEC filed its civil action and the issuer’s operations ceased.

In addition to ongoing delays in making payments to its investors, the firm received other red flags relating to the entity’s problems but continued to allow its brokers to sell the offering to their customers; in total, the firm’s brokers sold $11,759,798.01 of the offering to customers.

Despite the fact that the firm received numerous third-party due diligence reports for the other entities’ offering, it never obtained financial information about the issuer and its offerings from independent sources, such as audited financial statements, and although it received a specific fee related to due diligence purportedly performed in connection with each offering, the firm performed little due diligence beyond reviewing the private placement memoranda (PPM) for the issuer’s offerings. The firm’s representatives did not travel to the entity’s headquarters to conduct any due diligence for these offerings in person and did not see or request any financial information for the entity other than that contained in the PPM.

The Firm obtained a third-party due diligence report for one of the offerings after having sold these offerings for several months already; this report identified a number of red flags with respect to the offerings. Moreover, the firm should have been particularly careful to scrutinize each of the issuer’s offerings given the purported high rates of return but did not take the necessary steps, through obtaining financial information or otherwise, to ensure that these rates of return were legitimate, and not payable from the proceeds of later offerings, in the manner of a Ponzi scheme. Furthermore, the firm also did not follow up on the red flags documented in the third-party due diligence report; even with notice of these red flags, the firm continued to sell the offerings without conducting any meaningful due diligence.

The Firm failed to have reasonable grounds for approving the sale and allowing the continued sale of the offerings; even though the firm was aware of numerous red flags and negative information that should have alerted it to potential risks, the firm allowed its brokers to continue selling these private placements.The firm did not conduct meaningful due diligence for the offerings prior to approving them for sale to its customers; without adequate due diligence, the firm could not identify and understand the inherent risks of these offerings.The Firm failed to enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to detect or address potential red flags and negative information as it related to these private placements; the firm therefore failed to maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations.

As his member firm’s president, CEO and registered principal, Paris had overall supervisory responsibilities for the firm, including reviewing and performing due diligence for private placements and for reviewing and approving new products, including the assignment of a new product to a business unit.

Paris signed a sales agreement for a private placement offering and failed to perform due diligence beyond reviewing the private placement memorandum (PPM), and while he had received third-party due diligence reports regarding earlier private placements, he did not seek or obtain a report for the latest offering and did not conduct any continuing due diligence or follow-up because of the limited time between offerings, the similarity of the deals and representations from the issuer that no additional due diligence was necessary. Unlike earlier offerings, there were serious red flags that Paris could not identify without adequate due diligence.

In his firm’s sale of several offerings by another issuer, Paris failed to perform due diligence even though his firm received a specific fee related to due diligence purportedly performed in connection with each offering. Paris did not travel to the issuer’s headquarters to conduct due diligence and did not seek or request any financial information other than what was contained in the PPM. Once he had concluded that his firm could sell the offerings, Paris did not conduct any continuing due diligence or follow-up, and due to limited time between the offerings, the similarity of the deals and representations from the issuer that no material changes had occurred, he concluded that no additional due diligence was necessary. In addition, Paris did not believe it necessary to pay for due diligence reports for the new offerings because they would say the same thing as previous reports but they did identify numerous red flags. Moreover, Paris should have scrutinized each of the offerings given the high rates of return to ensure they were legitimate and not payable from proceeds of later offerings, as in a Ponzi scheme.

Acting on his firm’s behalf, Paris failed to maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations with respect to the offerings.

Camarillo entered into a contract with a company to sell its private placements, and sold approximately $370,000 of these private securities to his customers, receiving over $13,000 in commissions, without providing notice to, or receiving approval from, his member firm.

Camarillo’s firm’s written procedures, which he attested to reading and understanding, instructed employees to provide notice to the firm’s compliance department and to seek the firm’s written approval prior to engaging in any securities transactions not executed through the firm. The company provided Camarillo with sales literature, and without submitting the brochure to his firm for approval, he distributed the brochure to his customers; the brochure contained several unwarranted, exaggerated and misleading statements, omitted material facts and ignored risk while guaranteeing success.

Camarillo did not have a reasonable basis to recommend that his customers purchase the securities, had no experience selling these types of products and did not conduct proper due diligence. Camarillo did not sufficiently understand the products offered through the company or how the investments were managed; all of Camarillo’s customers who invested in the products informed Camarillo that they were seeking preservation of capital and viewed the investments as a retirement investment. Camarillo did not investigate the claims made in the sales literature that the returns were guaranteed, he had no basis to recommend the investment to customers seeking preservation of capital, and his recommendations to invest in the company were unsuitable.

Camarillo’s customers lost tens of thousands of dollars by relying on his recommendation, because even after partial reimbursement from the company’s court-ordered receivership, Camarillo’s customers only recouped 69 percent of their investment. Moreover, the products, as marketed, were securities, the sale of which required Camarillo to possess a Series 7 license; at the time he sold the securities, Camarillo held only a Series 6 license.

Acting through Locy, Brookstone Securities did not have WSPs addressing due diligence requirements for third-party placements.

Acting through Locy, Brookstone failed to conduct an adequate due diligence of a third-party private placement offering before Locy approved the offering of shares to customers. Locy’s due diligence efforts did not include any investigation into an equity fund, despite acknowledging that he knew very little about it or the third-party placement and could not get any solid information about the fund, including pending litigation or financial statements. Locy knew nothing about the fund that was not contained in a PPM the issuer prepared, but accepted that the firm representatives forming the offering had conducted due diligence and relied on their opinion of the fund. Locy acknowledged the representatives had limited, if any, experience forming a private placement.

The firm's representatives sold or participated in sales of shares to customers without notifying Locy or anyone else at the firm, which caused those sales to not be recorded on the firm’s books and records.

Brookstone Securities, Inc. and David William Locy: Censured; Fined $25,000 jointly/severally

Henry added information to an earlier copy of a private placement investor questionnaire that had previously been signed by a customer. The questionnaire itself had been completed by the customer while Henry was registered with a prior member firm and was later replaced at that prior firm by a different version; Henry maintained a copy of the earlier signed copy.

In response to an inquiry made by Henry’s new firm’s CCO regarding the source of a particular stock in the customer’s account, Henry utilized the earlier copy of the previously signed questionnaire from the customer that Henry had in his files and made alterations to the document by adding on the updated requested information sought by the CCO. Henry presented that altered document to the CCO without disclosing that he had made the alterations and by making the alterations to the questionnaire, he caused the document and, consequently, the firm’s records to be inaccurate.

The Firm failed to ensure that it established, maintained and enforced a supervisory system and written supervisory procedures (WSPs) reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the rules and regulations concerning private offering solicitations.

The firm’s procedures were deficient in that they failed to specify, among other things, who at the firm was responsible for performing due diligence, what activities by firm personnel were required to satisfy the due diligence requirement, how due diligence was to be documented, who at the firm was responsible for reviewing and approving the due diligence that was performed and authorizing the sale of the securities, and who was to perform ongoing supervision of the private offerings once customer solicitations commenced. As a result of the firm’s deficient supervisory system and WSPs, the firm failed to conduct adequate due diligence on private placement offerings. The Firm's WSPs required due diligence to be conducted on every private placement it offered, and required that such review had to be documented; the firm failed to enforce those provisions with respect to an offering. Had the firm conducted adequate due diligence, it reasonably should have known that the company had defaulted on its earlier notes offerings and that there was a misrepresentation in the private placement memorandum (PPM) with respect to principal and interest payments to investors in the earlier offerings. The Firm failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that it timely learned of the missed payments on the earlier notes offerings and disclosed them to prospective investors in the notes. Due to the firm’s lack of due diligence, DeRosa sold notes issued to customers, and in connection with those sales, the firm and DeRosa mischaracterized and/or negligently omitted certain material facts provided to investors. DeRosa sold $833,000 of the notes to customers and generated approximately $37,485 in gross commissions from the sales of the notes. Through DeRosa and another registered representative, the Firm solicited customers to invest in another company’s stock but failed to conduct adequate due diligence.

The owner of an investment banking firm represented that the customers’ funds would be wired to a client trust account at a bank and then forwarded to an escrow account, which a third party would control, before being invested; the firm did not take any steps to verify this claim before wiring the customer funds to the account. No one at the firm verified the existence of the client trust and escrow accounts, and, after the funds were wired, no one requested or received a bank account statement to verify the receipt and location of the funds; the firm failed to question why the wire instructions failed to reference the client trust account in the bank account title section on the form, but instead referenced the investment banking firm. Instead of directing the customers’ money into the escrow account, the owner of the investment banking firm kept the funds in bank accounts he controlled and used the funds for his own benefit.

In addition, in connection with his sales of the company’s stock, DeRosa disseminated to prospective investors a presentation he had received from the owner of the investment banking company, which summarized the offering. Moreover, the presentation constituted sales literature but did not comply with the content standards applicable to communications with the public and sales literature. Furthermore, the presentation failed to provide a fair and balanced treatment of risks and potential benefits, contained unwarranted or exaggerated claims, contained predictions of performance and failed to prominently disclose the firm’s name, failed to reflect any relationship between the firm and the non-FINRA member entities involved in the offering, and failed to reflect which product or services the firm was offering.

Garden State Securities, Inc.: Censured; Ordered to pay jointly and severally with DeRosa, $300,000 in restitution to investors. FINRA did not impose a fine against the firm after it considered, among other things, the firm’s revenues and financial resources

Kevin John DeRosa (Principal):  Fined $25,000; Ordered to pay jointly and severally with Garden State $300,000 in restitution to investors; Suspendedfrom association with any FINRA member in any capacity for 20 business days, and Suspended from association with any FINRA member in any Principal capacity only for 2 months.

National Securities failed to have reasonable grounds to believe that certain private placements offered pursuant to Regulation D were suitable for customers. Acting through Portes, as the firm’s Director of Alternative Investments/Director of Syndications, National failed to adequately enforce its supervisory procedures to conduct adequate due diligence as it relates to an offering. Portes and the firm became aware of multiple red flags regarding an offering, including liquidity concerns, missed interest payments and defaults, that should have put them on notice of possible problems, but the firm continued to sell the offering to customers. Acting through Portes, the Firm failed to enforce its supervisory procedures to conduct adequate due diligence relating to other offerings.

Portes reviewed the PPMs for these offerings and diligence reports others prepared, but the review was cursory.The due diligence reports noted significant risks and specifically provided that its conclusions were conditioned upon recommendations regarding guidelines, changes in the PPMs and heightened financial disclosure of affiliated party advances, but the firm did not investigate, follow up on or discuss any of these potential conflicts or risks with either the issuer or any third party. In addition, acting through Portes, the Firm failed to enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to detect or address potential “red flags” as related to these offerings; and the firm, acting through Portes, failed to maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations.

National Securities Corporation: Censured; Odered to pay a total of $175,000 in restitution to investors.

Matthew G. Portes  (Principal): Fned $10,000; Suspended from association with any FINRA member in any principal capacity only for 6 months.

Lichtenstein intentionally provided false testimony during a FINRA on-the-record interview regarding his knowledge of, and participation in, private securities transactions involving solicitation and sale of private placements within the branch for which he was employed as the branch manager. 

Lichtenstein participated in the sale of private securities in the total amount of $234,303.68 to customers without his member firm’s prior written approval.

Lichtenstein failed to reasonably supervise a branch office for which he acted as a branch manager. In response to a request to sell private placements at the branch, which Lichtenstein’s firm had specifically denied, stating that no one at the branch had approval to sell any private placements and Lichtenstein was aware of this prohibition, he learned of other private placements being sold by a branch registered representative and failed to inform the firm’s compliance department of the sales.

Because Lichtenstein was responsible for the review of electronic mail at the branch, he knew, or should have known through email review, of red flags indicating the sale of additional private placements but did not conduct additional investigation and did not inform the firm’s compliance department of the red flags.

Acting through Erickson and Brewer, the Firm:

• sold the private placement offerings of a company formed exclusively to acquire and provide growth to its parent company and a limited liability company for which Brewer was a director, without disclosing to the investors material facts that:
• the parent company had defaulted on a $2.5 million loan,
• had reported an operating loss of $1,622,912 for one calendar year and an approximate operating loss of $4.5 million for another calendar year, and
• had defaulted on interest payments to note-holders.
• continued to sell the limited liability company’s private placement offering to new investors, knowing that it had defaulted on its interest payments to existing investors and without disclosing that material fact to new investors.

The firm sold the private placement offerings to non-accredited investors without providing them with the financial statements required under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 506, resulting in the loss of exemption from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. Because no registration statement was in effect for the offerings and the registration exemption was ineffective, the firm sold these securities in contravention of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.

Acting through Erickson, the Firm conducted inadequate due diligence related to its sale of the offerings in that it failed to ensure the issuers had retained a custodian to handle certain investors’ qualified funds prior to accepting investment of Individual Retirement Account (IRA) funds into the offerings.

Ating through Erickson and Brewer, the Firm offered to sell and sold the company’s private placement offering by distributing to the public a private placement memorandum (PPM) containing unbalanced, unjustified, unwarranted or otherwise misleading statements; among other things, the PPM implied that the parent company was not experiencing financial difficulty and failed to disclose that it reported a significant loss one year. In addition, the investors in the company’s notes were not provided with financial statements for either the company or the parent company. Moreover, the PPM was misleading in that it failed to state clearly how offering proceeds would be used, lacked clarity regarding the relationship between the issuer and its affiliates, and failed to provide the basis for claims made regarding the performance expectations of the issuer or its affiliates.

Furthermore, the firm failed to establish adequate written supervisory procedures related to its sales of private placement offerings, in that the firm’s procedures failed to require that financial statements be provided to investors when private placement offerings are sold to non-accredited investors, pursuant to SEC Rule 506.

The Firm allowed Brewer to be actively engaged in managing the firm’s securities business without being registered as a principal and a representative although Brewer signed and submitted an attestation to FINRA stating he would not be actively engaged in the management of the firm’s securities business until he completed registration as a representative and principal. Among other things, Brewer reviewed and revised the firm’s recruitment brochure, approved offer letters to prospective firm registered representatives, dictated the structure of new representatives’ compensation, including the level of commissions and loan repayment terms, and instructed firm personnel to send private placement offering documents to prospective investors.

The firm maintained the registrations for individuals who were not active in the firm’s investment banking or securities business or were no longer functioning as registered representatives.

The Firm conducted a securities business on a number of days even though it had negative net capital on each of those dates. The firm’s net capital deficiencies were caused by its failure to classify contributions from the parent company as liabilities after the firm returned the contributions to the parent company within a one-year period of having received them, and improperly treating its assets as allowable even though all of its assets had been encumbered as security for a loan agreement the parent company executed. Moreover, the Firm had inaccurate general ledgers, trial balances and net capital computations, and filed inaccurate Financial and Operational Uniform Single

Brewer Financial Services, LLC: Expelled

Adam Gary Erickson (Principal) and Steven John Brewer: Barred

Genitrini advertised guaranteed returns on investments of up to 20 percent per year on a website belonging to a company he wholly owned. Genitrini claimed that his company was a full-service investment firm and would, among other claims, provide high-yield investment opportunities. The website declared that the company invested nationwide and all industries were considered, but did not disclose the nature of the investment product or the risks of investment.

Genitrini’s ads appeared on other websites guaranteeing returns, and his company’s contemplated private placement documents provided no assurance that by following its current investment strategy, it would be successful or profitable, although the subscription agreement also stated that the investments the company carried might be volatile and present operational risks.

Genitrini’s Internet ads constituted communications with the public; were not based on principles of fair dealing and good faith; were not fair and balanced; did not disclose risks associated with the investment; guaranteed promising returns that were exaggerated, unwarranted or misleading; and the predictions of performance were also exaggerated or unwarranted.

Genitrini’s private offering of securities, which involved promissory notes his company issued according to the private placement memorandum, was not made pursuant to an effective registration statement filed with the SEC; the offering was intended to be made pursuant to the exemption from registration in Section 4(2) of Rule 506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits offers or sales of securities by any form of general solicitation or general advertising. Genitrini’s use of the Internet and his company’s website violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, and guaranteeing returns in the offer of securities over the Internet violated Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.

In addition, Genitrini falsely described his work with his company on his member firm’s outside business activity disclosure form and also failed to disclose that he maintained a website for the company; Genitrini told his firm, in writing, that his business and website were for tax-planning services.

The Firm failed to establish, maintain and enforce a supervisory system and written procedures relating to private offerings the firm sold to its customers. The firm’s supervisory system and written procedures for private offerings were deficient; they did not identify due diligence steps to be taken for private offerings. The firm approved for sale, and sold, various private offerings by an entity that raised approximately $2.2 billion from over 20,000 investors through several Regulation D offerings.

The entity made all interest and principal payments on these Regulation D offerings until it began experiencing liquidity problems and stopped making payments on some of its earlier offerings; nevertheless, the entity proceeded with another offering. The firm’s due diligence for the offering consisted merely of reviewing the PPM and investor subscription documents, without seeking or obtaining financial documents or information from the issuer regarding the offering, nor did the firm obtain any due diligence report for the offering or visit the issuer’s facilities or meet with its key personnel. The firm approved for sale, and sold, a total of $258,597.16 to its customers for interests in another entity’s private offering. In addition, the firm failed to conduct due diligence for these offerings; among other things, it did not obtain offering documentation beyond the investor subscription documents. Moreover, the firm sold additional unregistered offerings to its customers and failed to conduct adequate due diligence for each of these other offerings.

Acting through Lapkin, the Firm failed to enforce its heightened supervisory procedures for a representative placed on heightened supervision based on his prior disciplinary history. Lapkin was responsible for implementing the heightened supervision plan, which required review of the representative’s correspondence on a daily basis, review of all of the representative’s transactions prior to execution, quarterly reviews with the representative of his business, and quarterly review of the representative’s journal of all conversations that resulted in any business. Lapkin did not perform any of the required steps and the firm failed to take any steps to ensure that he followed the plan. The firm, acting through Lapkin, allowed a representative to continue using a website, which is deemed an advertisement pursuant to NASD Rule 2210, that promoted investments to be made through the firm, even though it violated the content standards of the rule. The website failed to provide a sound basis for evaluating the investment products being promoted, and contained exaggerated, incomplete and oversimplified statements comparing alternative investments to traditional investment products. Also,  the website further made unsubstantiated claims by identifying investments as “premier” alternative investments and stating that alternative investments can help dampen volatility and provide protection in down markets without providing a credible basis for these claims. In addition, the website also compared alternative investments to publicly traded investments, but failed to disclose all of the material differences between the investments, including the risks associated with the alternative investments.

Acting through Lapkin, the Firm allowed its representatives to sell shares of a fund through a flawed PPM that failed to disclose that the fund’s manager had been terminated from his member firm because, according to his Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U5), he had misreported, falsely input and reported late into the firm’s internal booking systems for bond transactions, and that the fund manager had misreported numerous nondeliverable forward transactions, causing false profits on his profit and loss statements. Lapkin was aware of the content of the fund manager’s Form U5 and knew that the PPM was silent about it. This omission was material because, as disclosed in the PPM, the fund’s trading decisions relied primarily on the fund manager’s knowledge, judgment and experience.

Puritan Securities, Inc. nka First Union Securities, Inc.: Censured, Fined $10,000 (A lower fine was imposed after considering, among other things, the firm’s revenues and financial resources.)

Nathan Perry Lapkin: Fined $10,000; Suspended in Principal capacity only for 15 business days.

As her member firm’s CCO, Bush was responsible for creating, maintaining and updating her firm’s Written Supervisory Procedures (WSPs) and for conducting due diligence for private offerings. Bush’s firm approved for sale, and sold, various private offerings, and for one offering, Bush’s due diligence consisted of reviewing the PPM and investor subscription documents, but she did not seek or obtain financial documents or information from the issuer regarding the offering, did not obtain any due diligence report, did not visit the issuer’s facilities or meet with its key personnel. Bush did not take steps to ensure, or otherwise verify, that other firm principals were conducting any due diligence of the offering’s issuer.

The firm and Bush obtained a third-party due diligence report after firm customers had already invested in the offering. In regards to a third private offering that her firm approved for sale and sold, Bush conducted due diligence after the product had been sold to customers -- and her due diligence consisted of obtaining investor subscription documents without obtaining PPMs for the offerings, did not obtain any due diligence report from an independent third party and did not meet with any executives to understand the nature of the offerings.

Bush’s firm sold additional, different unregistered offering to customers, and Bush, acting in her capacity as CCO and the designed principal for private offerings, failed to conduct due diligence for each of these other offerings.

Moreover, the firm’s supervisory system and the firm’s written procedures for private offerings Bush drafted and maintained were deficient because the procedures Bush drafted and maintained did not identify, in any detail, specific due diligence steps to be taken for private offerings or identify specific documents to be obtained for private offerings the firm was contemplating selling. Furthermore, the firm’s written procedures for private offering due diligence were conclusory, non-specific and lacking in the requisite minimum detail regarding steps to be taken and firm personnel responsible for such steps.

As her member firm’s CCO, Bush was responsible for creating, maintaining and updating her firm’s Written Supervisory Procedures (WSPs) and for conducting due diligence for private offerings. Bush’s firm approved for sale, and sold, various private offerings, and for one offering, Bush’s due diligence consisted of reviewing the PPM and investor subscription documents, but she did not seek or obtain financial documents or information from the issuer regarding the offering, did not obtain any due diligence report, did not visit the issuer’s facilities or meet with its key personnel. Bush did not take steps to ensure, or otherwise verify, that other firm principals were conducting any due diligence of the offering’s issuer.

The firm and Bush obtained a third-party due diligence report after firm customers had already invested in the offering. In regards to a third private offering that her firm approved for sale and sold, Bush conducted due diligence after the product had been sold to customers -- and her due diligence consisted of obtaining investor subscription documents without obtaining PPMs for the offerings, did not obtain any due diligence report from an independent third party and did not meet with any executives to understand the nature of the offerings.

Bush’s firm sold additional, different unregistered offering to customers, and Bush, acting in her capacity as CCO and the designed principal for private offerings, failed to conduct due diligence for each of these other offerings.

Moreover, the firm’s supervisory system and the firm’s written procedures for private offerings Bush drafted and maintained were deficient because the procedures Bush drafted and maintained did not identify, in any detail, specific due diligence steps to be taken for private offerings or identify specific documents to be obtained for private offerings the firm was contemplating selling. Furthermore, the firm’s written procedures for private offering due diligence were conclusory, non-specific and lacking in the requisite minimum detail regarding steps to be taken and firm personnel responsible for such steps.

In connection with the sale of investments in a film production company, Flowers made fraudulent misrepresentations and omitted to disclose material information. Flowers collected at least $92,000 from investors, falsely representing that he would use their funds to finance a film production business and promising exorbitant, guaranteed returns. Instead of investing the funds, Flowers misused $30,498 to repay other investors and pay for personal expenses without the investors’ knowledge, consent or authorization.

Flowers made recommendations to a customer to invest in private placement offerings that were unsuitable in light of the customer’s financial situation, investment objective and financial needs.

Flowers attempted to settle away customers’ complaints without his member firm’s knowledge or consent.

Flowers signed an attestation form for a firm acknowledging that email communications with the public must be sent through the firm’s email address and copied to the compliance department, but Flowers communicated with customers via unapproved, outside email accounts without his member firms’ knowledge or consent, and as a result of his outside communications, his member firms were unable to review his emails to firm customers. In addition, Flowers engaged in private securities transactions without providing prior written notice to, and receiving prior written approval from, his member firms.

The Firm failed to:

• have reasonable grounds to believe that a private placement an entity offered pursuant to Regulation D was suitable for any customer, after it received red flags that the entity had financial issues and was not timely making interest payments, but continued to sell the offering to customers;
• enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and NASD and FINRA rules in connection with the sale of private placements;
• conduct adequate due diligence of the private placements or confirm that its representatives were doing their own due diligence;
• conduct adequate due diligence of private placements other entities offered; and
• enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and NASD and FINRA rules in connection with the sale of the private placements the entities offered pursuant to Regulation D.

The Firm reviewed cursory private placement memoranda (PPMs) for the offerings but failed to investigate red flags or analyze third-party sources of information or take affirmative steps to ensure the information in the offering documents was accurate.

The Firm failed to preserve electronic communications in a non-rewritable, non-erasable or “WORM” format that complied with books and records requirements, and the firm used third-party software for storing and retaining electronic communications that did not comply with the requirements of SEC Rule 17a-4(f). Although the Firm was informed that its electronic storage medium was non-compliant but did not take adequate remedial action to retain email properly.

Schwarten made an unsuitable recommendation to a customer, in light of the customer’s financial situation and needs, for the purchase of a private placement offering. Schwarten recommended that the customer take equity out of her home through a refinanced mortgage and use $100,000 of the proceeds to purchase the private placement offering.

Schwarten failed to appear for a FINRA on-the-record interview.

In connection with customers’ purchases of a private placement offering, DiMaggio falsely represented to each of the customers that she had personally invested funds with the issuer. Based on DiMaggio’s representation and recommendation, each of the customers invested $60,000 in the offering.

DiMaggio settled and/or attempted to settle potential customer complaints regarding undisclosed fees, failing to add a living benefit rider to a variable annuity and making unsuitable investment recommendations, without her member firm’s knowledge or approval.

DiMaggio exchanged business-related emails with customers using an unapproved email account, thereby causing her firm to violate its recordkeeping requirements. (FINRA Case #)

The Firm entered into an agreement with an entity to sell a private placement for which the firm’s brokers sold $1,415,940 of the private placement interests to customers, and the firm failed to create and maintain a reasonable supervisory system to detect and prevent sales practice violations in these transactions. The firm did not collect financial and other relevant information for the customers who purchased the private placement, and did not review these transactions to determine if the recommendations for the purchases were suitable for these customers.

Also, the firm failed to implement a supervisory system reasonably designed to review and retain electronic correspondence. The firm did not establish an email retention system that captured all of its brokers’ emails. The firm’s brokers were allowed to use email addresses using external domains, and the firm did not have the capability to review, capture and retain these emails.

As his member firm’s Chief Compliance Officer, Bruno failed to ensure that his firm established, maintained and enforced a supervisory system and WSPs reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the rules and regulations in connection with private offering solicitations. Acting through Bruno, his firm maintained a deficient supervisory system and WSPs with respect to private offering solicitations in that those procedures did not specify who at the firm was responsible for performing due diligence, what activities firm personnel were required to satisfy the due diligence requirement, how due diligence was to be documented, who at the firm was responsible for reviewing and approving the due diligence that was performed and for authorizing the sale of the securities, and who was to perform ongoing supervision of the private offerings once customer solicitations commenced.

As a result of its deficient WSPs, the firm failed to conduct adequate due diligence on private placement offerings, and Bruno failed to take any other steps to otherwise ensure that it was conducted.

Meckenstock failed to reasonably supervise a registered representative at his member firm in that the registered representative participated in sales of stock that were outside the course or scope of the registered representative’s employment with the firm. Meckenstock participated in certain sales of the stock himself, and failed to record the sales on the firm’s books and records as required by NASD Rule 3040(c).

Meckenstock failed to submit a written request to participate in the sale of stock, failed to receive written approval to participate in the transactions and failed to provide written approval to the registered representative to participate in the sales.

Meckenstock failed to conduct sufficient due diligence on the offering, failed to investigate the nature of the individual with the issuer, failed to investigate his relationship with the issuer, failed to question him about any additional sales he may have made to firm customers, and failed to investigate compensation that the registered representative was promised or received from the sale of the interests in the company.

Meckenstock failed to adequately supervise the resale of stock through a registered investment adviser (IA) the representative owned, and failed to review the IA’s books and records, which would have disclosed the representative’s sale of his shares of the stock to public customers.

Meckenstock reviewed a private placement memorandum and offering for his firm and approved it as a suitable investment, but failed to ensure that the issuer had established an escrow account, thereby failing to adequately supervise the sale of the offering and causing his firm to violate Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c2-4. In addition, Meckenstock failed to evidence his supervisory review and approval of customers’ purchases of interests in numerous offerings.

Wright engaged in private securities transactions when he participated in the sale of private placements related to telephone equipment and leasing agreements offered through various businesses connected to a company. Wright received no selling compensation, agreed to provide restitution of $1,617,485 to the customers by entering into purchase agreements with each customer and has commenced payment.

Wright’s member firm suspended him for 10 business days and placed him on heightened supervision for one year.

Cambridge failed to have reasonable grounds to believe that a private placement offered pursuant to Regulation D was suitable for any customer.

Acting through Fincher, its Chief Compliance Officer and registered principal, the Firm failed to

• conduct adequate due diligence of the private placement offering before allowing its brokers to sell the security,
• maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and
• enforce reasonable supervisory procedures to detect or address potential red flags as it related to the offering.

Fincher was the principal responsible for conducting due diligence on the offering and approved the security as a new product available for firm brokers to sell to their customers; he allowed the firm’s brokers to continue selling the security despite its ongoing failure to make overdue interest and principal payments. The Firm failed to have reasonable grounds for allowing the continued sale of the security even though the firm, through Fincher, was aware of numerous red flags concerning liquidity problems, delinquencies and defaults, but allowed its brokers to continue selling the security.

Cambridge Legacy Securities, L.L.C.:Censured; Ordered to pay $218,400 in restitution to customers. If the firm fails to provide FINRA with proof of restitution, it shall immediately be suspended from FINRA membership until such proof has been provided.

Tommy Edward Fincher: Fined $5,000; Suspended 6 months in Principal capacity only.

Yamanaka participated in the sales of Universal Lease Programs (ULPs) totaling $408,273.39 to members of the public without providing her member firm with written notice about the sales, and failed to obtain her firm’s written approval. Yamanaka received approximately $43,760 in commissions from her sales of the ULPs.

Yamanaka submitted documentation related to the ULPs to her firm and was told that the ULPs were not approved for sale. Yamanaka signed declarations in which she confirmed she had discussed the firm’s regulatory requirements with her supervisory principal; in these declarations, Yamanaka stated she had not offered or sold securities except those her firm offered and approved, had not engaged in any outside business activity which involved private securities transactions or private placements of securities, unless the firm approved them in advance, and informed her firm of all outside business activities for which she directly or indirectly received compensation. FINRA found that all of these statements were false.