Lorie falsified Letters Of Authorization ("LOAs"), which caused his firm’s books and records to be inaccurate, and used the LOAs to withdraw customer funds without the customer’s authorization; these LOAs contained the purported signature of a customer and the customer’s family members and authorized the transfer of checks totaling $21,290.60 to a mortgage company and another $15,000 check to a third-party account. The checks were issued as Lorie requested; neither the customer nor any of his family members authorized or signed the
Lorie failed to respond to FINRA requests for information.
Dusenberry borrowed $742,500 from his customers and, in several instances, Dusenberry used the proceeds of one loan to repay an earlier loan from a different customer. Dusenberry failed to repay a total of approximately $500,000 to his customers.
The firm prohibited borrowing money from customers unless the borrowing arrangement fell within certain enumerated exceptions, such as a loan from an immediately family member; regardless of the circumstances, however, employees were required to obtain the firm’s written pre-approval for all loans, and Dusenberry neither requested nor received the firm’s written pre-approval for any of his loans.
In order to effect one of the loans, Dusenberry signed the customer’s name to a Letter of Authorization (LOA) and submitted it to the firm, which caused the firm to transfer $30,000 from the customer’s account to another customer’s account. In order to effect a loan from a different customer, Dusenberry signed that customer’s name to an LOA without her knowledge, authorization or consent, and submitted it to the firm, which caused the firm to transfer $32,000 from the customer’s account to another customer’s account.
Crump was the CCO at his member firm and utilized his position to convert approximately $14,000 from firm customers’ brokerage accounts by using fictitious documents to effect unauthorized transfers of securities and cash from the customers’ accounts to a trust account he established at his firm.
Crump transferred securities and cash worth approximately $4,000 from one customer’s account by using a fictitious letter of authorization to effect the conversion. The findings also stated that two days before the transfer, Crump used the firm’s systems to temporarily change the address on the customer’s account to Crump’s attention at his work address, the effect of which was to have correspondence and other notices relating to the account sent to him at his firm.
Crump used a fictitious retirement account distribution form and a fictitious letter of authorization to effect the conversion of securities and cash worth approximately $10,000 from another customer’s Individual Retirement Account (IRA) to the customer’s cash account, and Crump transferred the securities and cash from the customer’s cash account to the trust account he controlled. The customers did not know about or authorize the transfers.Crump used the unlawfully converted funds to pay for his personal and business expenses.
Vinas converted approximately $3.3 million from customers, mostly Mexico-based, while he was associated with member firms and served as the registered representative responsible for these customers’ brokerage accounts.
Vinas asked customers to sign blank documents, including firm documents that were printed in English when none of the customers spoke or read English, but they complied with Vinas’ request.
A variable credit line account was opened at Vinas’ firm in the customers’ name, and Vinas submitted or caused to be submitted applications requesting increases in the credit line that the firm approved, but the customers had not authorized the opening of the credit account or the subsequent credit increases, nor were they aware of the existence of the credit account. Vinas forged, or caused to be forged, customer signatures on Letters of Authorization (LOAs) and had a customer sign blank LOAs, which he submitted to his firm purportedly authorizing the transfer of customer funds without these customers’ authorization or knowledge. Vinas submitted, or caused to be submitted, to another member firm fraudulent verbal LOAs without the customers’ authorization or knowledge, which allowed him to wire funds from the customers’ accounts. In addition, Vinas presented false account documents to the customers, which reflected fictitious account balances although he had closed the account after taking the last remaining funds from the account.
Vinas failed to respond to FINRA requests to appear and provide testimony.
Oftring was responsible for supervising a former registered representative of his member firm and failed to take appropriate action to reasonably supervise her to detect and prevent her violations and achieve compliance with applicable rules in connection with a customer’s account. Among other things, Oftring failed to take reasonable steps to follow up on certain indications of potential misconduct that should have alerted him to the representative’s violations.
The representative engaged in excessive, short-term trading in the customer’s account, which resulted in losses of approximately $60,000; the account was subject to frequent margin calls and transfers from a third-party account to satisfy margin calls in the account, and once, the representative transferred funds back to the third-party account by forging the customer’s signature on an LOA.
Oftring was aware of
Kang made loans totaling at least $294,000 to a firm customer who was also a close personal friend. The loans were in the form of cash and checks to the customer and undertaken to assist the customer in meeting her business obligations.
Although the customer had signed promissory notes, she died and Kang has not been fully repaid. At the time she made the loans, Kang was aware that her member firm did not permit loans from or to customers unless they were immediate family members; however, Kang did not obtain pre-approval from her firm prior to lending monies to the customer, nor did she otherwise inform the firm of the loans.
Shah made unauthorized foreign currency trades in a customer bank account, resulting in margin calls being generated for the account and consequently the customer’s other bank accounts were frozen, preventing the customer from transferring funds from those accounts. Shah made unauthorized money transfers from another customer’s bank account to satisfy, in part, the margin calls for the first client and to be able to transfer funds at its request.
In order to effect the unauthorized fund transfers, Shah forged a signature and created falsified Letters of Authorization (LOAs) by cutting a bank director’s signature from an account opening document and pasting it on a fabricated LOA. Shah fabricated documents regarding another client’s obligation to meet capital calls and falsely created a memorandum representing that the capital calls had been met.
Shah falsely told the customer’s beneficial owner that all outstanding calls had been met and to ignore notices he too was receiving. To make the memorandum appear authentic, Shah fabricated an internal email address for a fictitious employee and sent the memorandum to the beneficial owner to make him believe that the calls had been met.
Shah failed to respond to FINRA requests to provide on-the-record testimony and to provide a signed statement.
Herrero-Rovira converted approximately $203,000 in customer funds by forging customers’ signatures on Letters of Authorization (LOAs) and firm checks issued pursuant to the LOAs, and depositing the checks into his personal bank account or others’ account without the customers’ knowledge or authorization.
Herrero-Rovira converted an additional $16,000 from a customer by causing a check payable to the customer in that amount to be withdrawn from the customer’s account without the customer’s knowledge or authorization, and forging the customer’s check endorsement.
Herrero-Rovira failed to respond to FINRA requests for information.
Medearis became an additional credit card holder on a customer’s credit card accounts which were revolving lines of credit. Medearis made charges to the cards totaling approximately $134,000, effectively borrowing this amount through the credit card transactions, and subsequently made payments to cover the charges.
Medearis’ member firm’s written procedures prohibited registered representatives from borrowing money from or loaning money to customers unless the customer was a member of the registered representative’s immediate family and the registered representative had requested and received prior written permission from the firm. Medearis borrowed an additional $132,000 from the customer in separate transactions, and Medearis never informed his firm.
Medearis loaned $6,420.33 to a customer who was a member of his immediate family but failed to obtain the firm’s prior written permission before entering into the loan arrangement with the customer.