Specifically, the order finds that Schwartz spoofed-defined in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) as bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution-in calendar spreads involving Natural Gas (NG) and Reformulated Blendstock for Oxygenate Blending Gasoline (RBOB) futures contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange on multiple occasions from approximately April 2020 to July 2020.

The order requires Schwartz to pay a $100,000 civil monetary penalty and incur a four-month suspension from trading on or subject to the rules of any CFTC-designated exchange and all other CFTC-registered entities and in all commodity interests. Schwartz is also ordered to cease and desist from violating the CEA's spoofing prohibition.

[F]rom at least in or about 2020 through at least in or about March 2020, CABRERA, HERNANDEZ, and RAMIREZ engaged in a scheme to deceive U.S. banks and a leading cryptocurrency exchange platform (the "Cryptocurrency Exchange") by purchasing more than $4 million in cryptocurrency and then falsely claiming that the cryptocurrency purchase transactions were unauthorized, deceiving the U.S. banks and the Cryptocurrency Exchange into reversing those transactions and redepositing the money into the bank accounts that the Defendants controlled.  The Defendants then withdrew the money from the bank accounts.

To effect this scheme, the Defendants opened accounts with the Cryptocurrency Exchange, frequently using photos of fake U.S. passports, fake drivers' licenses, and stolen personal identifying information.  The Cryptocurrency Exchange accounts were linked to bank accounts that the Defendants controlled.  The Defendants used money that had been deposited into the linked bank accounts, frequently through a series of cash deposits made using ATMs, to purchase cryptocurrency.  That cryptocurrency was then quickly transferred to other cryptocurrency wallets outside of the Cryptocurrency Exchange that were controlled by the Defendants and their co-conspirators.  After the cryptocurrency was transferred, the Defendants made telephone calls to the U.S. banks during which they falsely represented that the cryptocurrency purchases were unauthorized, leading the banks to reverse the transactions. 

The operation of this scheme by the Defendants resulted in U.S. banks processing more than $4 million in fraudulent reversals and the Cryptocurrency Exchange losing more than $3.5 million worth of cryptocurrency. 

Between 2016 and 2020, RUSSELL DWAYNE LEWIS engaged in a series of brazen schemes to misrepresent his identity, his wealth, and his professional and personal background in order to defraud multiple individuals and at least one corporate entity.  For years, LEWIS lived under assumed names, using the birth date of a real individual with the name of one of his aliases, and utilizing the social security number of yet another individual.  As opportunities arose, LEWIS told increasingly outrageous lies to individuals around him, including a close friend of many years, an individual who turned to him for his claimed expertise in astrology, and representatives of a major company he falsely purported to intend to purchase.

In one scheme, LEWIS befriended an individual ("Victim-1"), claiming to Victim-1 that he was a billionaire businessman.  As part of their increasingly close friendship, and believing that LEWIS was a successful businessman, Victim-1 solicited professional and investment advice from LEWIS.  In response, and with greater frequency over time, LEWIS solicited "investments" from Victim-1 in the tens and then hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Eventually, Victim-1 went to work for LEWIS, working to explore opportunities in business and finance to assist LEWIS in identifying investment opportunities.  LEWIS continued to ask Victim-1 for money, which was characterized as investments and/or loans, and which Victim-1 routinely provided.  LEWIS had Victim-1 seek out investment opportunities, only to repeatedly back out of prospective deals at the last moment, claiming difficulties in accessing his vast wealth.  By 2020, Victim-1 had transferred more than $3 million of loan and/or investment funds to LEWIS in less than three years, virtually none of which was ever paid back.

In addition to his purported business activities, LEWIS also separately charged some individuals for astrological readings and analyses.  One such individual was a widow with four children who met LEWIS in or about 2018 ("Victim-2").  Victim-2 continued to have contact with LEWIS in the coming years, including for astrological readings.  In 2020, over the course of several months, LEWIS defrauded Victim-2 out of approximately $555,000 by pressuring her into paying him money for a purported real estate investment opportunity.  In truth, there was no such investment opportunity, and LEWIS spent Victim-2's money on personal expenses, including office supplies that facilitated and promoted LEWIS's other schemes.  Victim-2 received back virtually none of her "investment."

Finally, in August and September 2020, LEWIS fraudulently attempted to acquire a corporate entity in bankruptcy proceedings ("Corporation-1").  LEWIS made a purported all‑cash offer to purchase Corporation-1 for $290 million, which resulted in weeks of due diligence processes, legal discussions, and negotiations-including through which Getz and others had access to certain of Corporation-1's internal business records and materials.  Corporation-1 and its representatives dedicated significant time and resources to the purported offer, based on the false premise that LEWIS intended to, and could, pay hundreds of millions of dollars for Corporation‑1.  In fact, LEWIS had no intention or ability to purchase Corportion-1, and ultimately he backed out of the deal.

Between July 2021 and September 2021, Kadmon, which, prior to its acquisition by Sanofi, was a publicly-traded biopharmaceutical company traded under the ticker symbol "KDMN" on the NASDAQ, engaged GLASSNER and the Consulting Firm to provide executive compensation consulting services related to a potential acquisition.  In connection with this engagement, GLASSNER had access to material, non-public information, which he misappropriated and, in violation of the duties that he owed to Kadmon, used to trade Kadmon stock and call options between on or about August 3, 2021, and on or about August 23, 2021.  On September 8, 2021, Kadmon publicly announced that it had agreed to be acquired by Sanofi for a per-share price significantly above the share price at which Kadmon was trading.  That day, Kadmon's share price increased by approximately 71% and GLASSNER ultimately profited $368,000 on the Kadmon stock and call options he had previously purchased. 

As part of his plea agreement, GLASSNER has agreed to forfeit $368,000. 

[S]prague participated in a tech support scam that operated from approximately January 2018 through April 2019, which defrauded numerous elderly victims. The conspirators, some of whom were located overseas, falsely represented themselves to be online computer tech support personnel to obtain money from elderly victims who believed that they were paying for necessary computer repairs or installing computer security software.  After the victim agreed to make payment to the telemarketer for purported tech support, access to the victim's computer occurred while the victim believed that a legitimate service had been received. While conspirators were remotely connected to each victim's computer, the conspirators were able to access each victim's personal information, including access to the victim's financial accounts. 

Subsequently, the conspirators contacted each victim to offer purported refunds to the victims for the purchase of the original service. The telemarketers instructed each victim to allow remote access to the computer and then instructed the victim to log into their online banking platform to allow for a direct deposit of the refund. Upon having access to the victim's computer, the telemarketer falsely represented that a deposit had been made into the victim's account and would purport to accidentally deposit large amounts of money into the victim's account.  Conspirators then instructed the victims to return the false overpayment in the form of cash or cashier's checks via U.S. mail and other parcel delivery services to Sprague. 

During her participation in the scheme, Sprague opened various bank accounts in which she was the sole signor on each account. She also opened several post office boxes at authorized depositories in Cape Coral. Sprague routinely deposited the victims' funds into her bank accounts before she disbursed and transferred the proceeds to other members of the conspiracy. Sprague often initiated international wire transfers, that had been funded with victims' funds, to her co-conspirators. She retained a portion of the fraud proceeds to use for her own personal benefit. Sprague received at least $250,000 in proceeds from the fraud.

After the victims conducted cash withdrawals or purchased cashier's checks as form of repayment to the purported technology support company and mailed the money to Sprague, the victims discovered that the refund and purported overpayment were false. During the remote access, the telemarketer often transferred monies from the victim's savings account or line of credit to the victim's checking account to give the fraudulent appearance that the victim's checking account was credited for the refund and purported overpayment.