Securities Industry Commentator by Bill Singer Esq

May 23, 2022








https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-86
Without admitting or denying the findings in an SEC Order
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2022/ia-6032.pdf, BNY Mellon Investment Adviser, Inc. agreed to a Cease-and-Desist, a Censure, and to pay a $1.5 million penalty -- the sanctions reflect considerations of BNY Mellon Investment Adviser's prompt remedial acts and cooperation. The SEC Order found that BNY violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8, and Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act. As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

[F]rom July 2018 to September 2021, BNY Mellon Investment Adviser represented or implied in various statements that all investments in the funds had undergone an ESG quality review, even though that was not always the case. The order finds that numerous investments held by certain funds did not have an ESG quality review score as of the time of investment.

UDF Executives Sentenced to Combined 20 Years in Prison (DOJ Release)
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/udf-executives-sentenced-combined-20-years-prison
After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas United Development Funding ("UDF") Chief Executive Officer Hollis Morrison Greenlaw, UDF Partnership President Benjamin Lee Wissink, UDF Chief Financial Officer Cara Delin Obert, and UDF Asset Management Director Jeffrey Brandon Jester were convicted of ten counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud affecting a financial institution, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and securities fraud. Greenlaw was sentenced to seven years in prison; Wissink to five years; Obert to five years; and Jester to three years; and, further Greenlaw, Wissink, and  Obert were ordered to pay fines of $50,000 each. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

Founded in 2003 and headquartered in Grapevine, UDF utilized a family of five funds - UDF I, II, III, IV, and V - to invest in various residential real estate developers and private homebuilders.

When developers failed to repay money they borrowed from one fund, triggering multi-million dollar shortfalls, the defendants transferred money out of another fund in order to pay distributions to the original fund's investors, all without disclosing the transfers to the SEC and the investing public.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/virginia-beach-woman-sentenced-lottery-scheme-defrauding-elderly-victims
Terry Lynn Miller, 62, was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to 57 months in prison. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release, Miller:

signed a cease-and-desist order with the United States Postal Service in June 2019, in which she agreed to stop participating in fraudulent lottery and sweepstakes schemes. In those schemes, victims would be falsely told they had won millions of dollars but needed to first pay thousands of dollars in taxes and fees to receive their winnings. After signing the order, Miller immediately resumed her participation in the scheme and continued until she was arrested in May 2021. Miller would deposit the money the victims sent her into her personal bank accounts, and then convert it and funnel it to her co-conspirators. Miller also forged victim signatures on fraudulent checks and mailed locked briefcases to victims. The victims were told the briefcases contained their winnings and that they would receive the combination to the lock when they paid their taxes and fees. However, Miller had packed the briefcases with Hampton Roads newspapers and magazines. In sum, about ten victims were defrauded of over $220,000. Some victims lost their life savings.

Indiana Woman Sentenced To 48 Months' Imprisonment For Conspiracy To Commit Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, And Money Laundering In Advance-Fee Fraud Scheme Targeting Deaf And Elderly (DOJ Release)
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/indiana-woman-sentenced-48-months-imprisonment-conspiracy-commit-mail-fraud-wire-fraud
After a seven-day jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Donna L. Summerlin, age 63, was convicted on conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering; and she was sentenced to 48 months in prison plus two years of supervised released and ordered to pay $723,436.57 in restitution. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

[S]ummerlin was convicted in June 2021, of accepting over $1.2 million from victims of cross-border advance-fee schemes following a seven-day jury trial.  Many of the identified victims were either elderly, deaf, or both.  In these schemes, victims were contacted through Facebook and told that they were winners of a "deaf lottery" or that they had been selected for special and exclusive government grants or other programs.  Summerlin herself is deaf, and the trial and other court proceedings were conducted with a team of American Sign Language (ASL) interpreters. 

In order to claim their supposed prize, grant, or other financial reward, victims were directed to prepay expenses such as taxes and customs fees.  Victims were persuaded to do so with the false promise of a much larger payoff.  After making an initial payment, victims were directed to make additional larger payments.  In some cases, fraudsters were successful at getting multiple payments from victims, who never received any financial reward. 

Fraudsters contacting potential victims through Facebook, email, and text messages used fake names and photographs to disguise themselves.  These fraudsters also took over the accounts of victims so that they could lure their friends into sending money and to reassure them of the scheme's legitimacy when victims had doubts about participating.  Victims were instructed to send these payments to Summerlin, who worked as a "money mule" or intermediary for these fraudsters for approximately four years, from 2012 to 2016. 

At trial, the Government showed that Summerlin received over $1.2 million from over 100 people across the country and, in some cases, other countries such as Canada and Australia.  Victims mailed Summerlin checks, cash, and money orders.  They also wired her funds through bank-t-bank electronic wire transfers and sent her money through Western Union and MoneyGram money transfers.  The victims included a deaf elderly couple that resided in this District during the time period of the conspiracy.  The Government showed that this couple sent Summerlin around $500,000, depleting their life savings.

After receiving these funds, Summerlin rapidly withdrew them from the more than 40 bank accounts she used for these activities.  Typically, she wired a portion of the funds to coconspirators in Nigeria and Great Britain.  She also made large cash withdrawals, which were used to send funds to coconspirators and for personal use.  Finally, she sent a large number of Western Union and MoneyGram money transfers to many of the same recipients in Nigeria and Great Britain. 

Evidence at trial showed that Summerlin retained funds received from fraud victims for personal use as well.

https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-85
Without admitting or denying the findings in an SEC Order
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2022/34-94955.pdf, Wells Fargo Advisors agreed to a Censure,  a Cease and Desist Order, and to pay $7 million to settle findings that it violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 17a-8. In November 2017, the SEC issued a settled order against Wells Fargo Advisors for failing to timely file at least 50 SARs. As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

[D]ue to Wells Fargo Advisors' deficient implementation and failure to test a new version of its internal anti-money laundering (AML) transaction monitoring and alert system adopted in January 2019, the system failed to reconcile the different country codes used to monitor foreign wire transfers. As a result, Wells Fargo Advisors did not timely file at least 25 SARs related to suspicious transactions in its customers' brokerage accounts involving wire transfers to or from foreign countries that it determined to be at a high or moderate risk for money laundering, terrorist financing, or other illegal money movements. The order also found that, beginning in April 2017, Wells Fargo Advisors failed to timely file at least nine additional SARs due to a failure to appropriately process wire transfer data into its AML transaction monitoring system in certain other situations.   

https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/fda_documents/2019062612901
%20Blakely%20Page%20CRD%202922955%20%20AWC%20lp.pdf
For the purpose of proposing a settlement of rule violations alleged by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), without admitting or denying the findings, prior to a regulatory hearing, and without an adjudication of any issue, Blakely Page, submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent ("AWC"), which FINRA accepted. The AWC asserts that Blakely Page was first registered in 1998, and by 2007, he was registered with Sprouting Rock Capital Advisors, LLC.  In accordance with the terms of the AWC, FINRA imposed upon Blakely Page a $5,000 fine and a six-month suspension from associating with any FINRA member in all capacities.  As alleged in part in the AWC:

In early 2017, Page formed a hedge fund (the Feeder Fund). The Feeder Fund was formed to pool investor funds and make an investment in another, unaffiliated hedge fund (the Master Fund). During the first two quarters of 2017, Page gathered information from the Master Fund, which he and others used to create marketing materials for the Feeder Fund. Specifically, the Master Fund provided unaudited financials claiming that the fund had realized, net of fees, a rate of return exceeding 80% in 2016. Page did not independently verify the accuracy of the performance results provided by the Master Fund, but asked others to conduct due diligence on the Master Fund. 

The marketing materials for the Feeder Fund included the performance numbers for the Master Fund that were provided by the Master Fund. However, the performance numbers provided by the Master Fund significantly overstated the Master Fund's historic rate of return, a material fact. 

Between October 2017 and October 2018, Page distributed the marketing materials for the Feeder Fund, which contained the materially inaccurate performance numbers for the Master Fund, to more than two dozen prospective investors. Page also exchanged emails with multiple prospective investors in which he affirmed the accuracy of the Master Fund's performance results as set forth in the Feeder Fund's marketing materials. He did so even after others at the Feeder Fund received information that called those performance results into question; Page did not review that information because he relied on others to do so. 

Seven different investments were made in the Feeder Fund totaling approximately $1.7 million. When the Master Fund stopped providing continuing performance information and other customary investment materials to the Feeder Fund, the Feeder Fund redeemed its investors' investments, and the investors received full redemptions. 

By making negligent misrepresentations of material fact to prospective investors, Page violated FINRA Rule 2010. 

https://www.brokeandbroker.com/6457/finra-leggett-audit/

On February 18, 2022, FINRA announced that it had hired a law firm to conduct an independent review of how FINRA Dispute Resolution Services complied with its rules, policies and procedures for arbitrator selection in an arbitration proceeding whose award was recently vacated by an Atlanta Superior Court judge. Three months have passed. Not a sound. Not a peep. On the other hand, brick by brick, a lovely stonewall seems to be getting built. 

February 18, 2022 FINRA Press Release

Ninety-four days ago, FINRA published: "FINRA Hires Firm to Conduct Independent Review of Arbitrator Selection Process" (FINRA Press Release / February 18, 2022)
https://www.finra.org/media-center/newsreleases/2022/finra-hires-firm-conduct-independent-review-arbitrator-selection. The February 18th FINRA Press Release stated in part that:

FINRA announced today that it has hired the Lowenstein Sandler law firm to conduct an independent review of how FINRA Dispute Resolution Services (DRS) complied with its rules, policies and procedures for arbitrator selection in an arbitration proceeding whose award was recently vacated by an Atlanta Superior Court judge.

"We take this matter very seriously. FINRA recognizes the importance of maintaining trust in the system and is committed to ensuring the DRS arbitration forum is operated in a fair and neutral manner," said FINRA President and CEO Robert Cook. "In keeping with that commitment, FINRA's Audit Committee has engaged an independent, outside party to review how the arbitrator selection process was carried out in this case, and to determine whether any improvements to the process may be warranted. FINRA will make the results of this review public."

February 22, 2022 BrokeAndBroker.com Blog

In response to FINRA's February 18th Press Release, I published: "Cynical FINRA Press Release Lacks Urgency In Response To Arbitration Fiasco" (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / February 22, 2022)
https://www.brokeandbroker.com/6302/finra-leggett-audit/ In my article, I offered this rebuke:

[W]hat one would have expected from FINRA's Audit Committee would have been a explicit order -- a clear-cut demand -- that the Lowenstein law firm immediately initiate an investigation into the "arbitrator selection process," and not just limited to "this matter" (Leggett) as is stated in the Release by both FINRA's CEO and the Audit Committee's Chair. At a minimum, Audit Committee Chair Drummond should have promised that all stops will be pulled out to complete said investigation and to submit a FINAL REPORT to the Audit Committee within no more than 90 days. Chair Drummond should have made it clear that he will move heaven and earth and make all financial resources available to Lowenstein in a palpable attempt to purge even a hint of conflict from FINRA's arbitration selection process. Instead, we get tepid. We get trust. We get looking forward. We get coming months.

FINRA's Regulatory Deadlines

As to my suggested deadline for the issuance of a final investigative report "within no more than 90 days," today is now 94 days after the publication of FINRA's announced hiring of a law firm to conduct an independent review. Is 90 days too short a period of time -- is it too arbitrary a deadline? Keep in mind that an ample record has already been developed during the underlying FINRA arbitration proceeding and at the state court. Moreover, FINRA narrowed the scope of the investigation to how FINRA Dispute Resolution Services (DRS) complied with its rules, policies and procedures for arbitrator selection in an arbitration proceeding whose award was recently vacated by an Atlanta Superior Court judge. The law firm hired by FINRA has a very focused question to investigate involving the selection of arbitrators in one arbitration. Consider these deadlines imposed by FINRA upon Respondents enmeshed in the self-regulator's disciplinary process:

  • FINRA Code of Procedure Rule 9264: Motion for Summary Disposition provides that "All pre-hearing motions for summary disposition and supporting papers shall be filed at least 21 days before the time set for the hearing, or at such earlier time as ordered by the Hearing Officer. "

  • FINRA Code of Procedure Rule 9215: Answer to Complaint provides that a Respondent named in a FINRA Disciplinary Complaint "shall serve an answer to the complaint on all other Parties within 25 days after service of the complaint on such Respondent . . ." 

  • FINRA Code of Procedure Rule 9311: Appeal by Any Party; Cross-Appeal  provides that a "Respondent or the Department of Enforcement may file a written notice of appeal within 25 days after service of a decision." 

  • FINRA Code of Procedure Rule 9222: Extensions of Time, Postponements, and Adjournments, which states in pertinent part that "Postponements, adjournments, or extensions of time for filing papers shall not exceed 28 days unless the Hearing Officer states on the record or provides by written order the reasons a longer period is necessary." 

  • FINRA Code of Procedure Rule 9312: Review Proceeding Initiated By Adjudicatory Council  provides that a Hearing Panel Decision "shall be subject to a call for review within 45 days after the date of service of the decision. . ."
Compared to the FINRA deadlines cited above, requiring the submission of a final investigative report to the FINRA Audit Committee within no more than 90 days isn't unfair or unreasonable. To the contrary, it's nearly three times longer than deadlines that FINRA imposes upon Respondents in its regulatory proceedings, and twice as long as the period of time during which the NAC can call a Hearing Panel Decision for review. Sort of the old what's good for the goose is good for the gander, no?

Yet, here we are: May 23, 2022 -- 94 days after FINRA's February 18, 2022, Press Release. 

Not a sound. 

Not a peep. 

Heaven is unmoved. 

Earth remains in its orbit. 

Our trust was misplaced. 

We still look forward at nothing. 

The coming months keep coming.

= = = = =

Cynical FINRA Press Release Lacks Urgency In Response To Arbitration Fiasco
 BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / February 22, 2022
https://www.brokeandbroker.com/6302/finra-leggett-audit/

FINRA has not been having a fun time in recent weeks when it comes to the purported integrity of its arbitration forum: 

Court Finds FINRA Arbitration Process Not Fundamentally Fair (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / February 4, 2022)
http://www.brokeandbroker.com/6265/finra-wells-fargo-arbitration/

Brian Leggett and Bryson Holdings, LLC, Claimants, v. Wells Fargo Clearing Services, LLC and Jay Windsor Pickett III, Respondents (FINRA Arbitration Award / 17-01077 / July 31, 2019)
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/aao_documents/17-01077.pdf

Brian Leggett and Bryson Holdings, LLC, Petitioners, v. Wells Fargo Clearing Services, LLC d/b/a Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC and Jay Windsor Pickett III, Respondents (Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioners' Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, 2019CV328949)
https://brokeandbroker.com/PDF/LeggettMotVacFultonCo191030.pdf

Brian Leggett and Bryson Holdings, LLC, Petitioners, v. Wells Fargo Clearing Services, LLC d/b/a Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC and Jay Windsor Pickett III, Respondents (Order Granting Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and Denying Cross Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award, Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, 2019CV328949)
https://brokeandbroker.com/PDF/LeggettOrderFultonCo220125.pdf

Federal Court Can't Find Any Basis For FINRA Arbitration Decision In HSBC Managing Director Case (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / February 10, 2022)
http://www.brokeandbroker.com/6280/finra-gross-expungement/

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Adam Gross, Claimant, v. HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., Respondent (FINRA Arbitration Award 21-00392 / September 3, 2021) https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/aao_documents/21-00392.pdf

Adam Gross, Plaintiff, v. HSBC, Defendant (Complaint, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 21-CV-08636 / October 21, 2021)
https://brokeandbroker.com/PDF/GrossSDNYComp211021.pdf

Adam Gross, Petitioner, v. HSBC, Respondent (Order and Opinion, SDNY, 21-CV-08636 / February 8, 2022)
https://brokeandbroker.com/PDF/GrossSDNYOrdOp.pdf

In response to a firestorm of criticism and rumblings from Congress about its arbitration process and forum, FINRA hired what it says is an independent outside law firm to conduct a review. Rather than stand in the way of FINRA's self-serving press, let me offer it to you in full bloom:

https://www.finra.org/media-center/newsreleases/2022/finra-hires-firm-conduct-independent-review-arbitrator-selection

WASHINGTON-FINRA announced today that it has hired the Lowenstein Sandler law firm to conduct an independent review of how FINRA Dispute Resolution Services (DRS) complied with its rules, policies and procedures for arbitrator selection in an arbitration proceeding whose award was recently vacated by an Atlanta Superior Court judge.

"We take this matter very seriously. FINRA recognizes the importance of maintaining trust in the system and is committed to ensuring the DRS arbitration forum is operated in a fair and neutral manner," said FINRA President and CEO Robert Cook. "In keeping with that commitment, FINRA's Audit Committee has engaged an independent, outside party to review how the arbitrator selection process was carried out in this case, and to determine whether any improvements to the process may be warranted. FINRA will make the results of this review public."

Christopher Gerold, a partner in Lowenstein's Securities Litigation and Corporate Investigations & Integrity Practice Groups, will lead the independent review and report the firm's findings directly to the Audit Committee of FINRA's Board of Governors. Prior to joining Lowenstein in January, Gerold was Chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities from 2017-2021 and served as President of the North American Securities Administrators Association.

"We trust Lowenstein's ability to carry out an independent review of the arbitrator selection process administered in this matter and look forward to receiving their findings in the coming months," said Lance Drummond, FINRA Governor and Chair of the Audit Committee.

DRS administers an arbitration forum to assist in the resolution of disputes involving investors, securities firms and their registered employees. Although securities firms and investment advisers often include mandatory arbitration clauses in their customer account agreements, FINRA rules do not require this practice. The arbitration forum operates in accordance with rules that have been approved by the SEC, after a finding that the rules are in the public interest. The SEC regularly examines DRS's operations.

About FINRA
FINRA is a not-for-profit organization dedicated to investor protection and market integrity. It regulates one critical part of the securities industry-brokerage firms doing business with the public in the United States. FINRA, overseen by the SEC, writes rules, examines for and enforces compliance with FINRA rules and federal securities laws, registers broker-dealer personnel and offers them education and training, and informs the investing public. In addition, FINRA provides surveillance and other regulatory services for equities and options markets, as well as trade reporting and other industry utilities. FINRA also administers a dispute resolution forum for investors and brokerage firms and their registered employees. For more information, visit www.finra.org.

So, lemme see here: FINRA's Audit Committee has engaged an independent, outside law firm to review how the arbitrator selection process was carried out in this case, and to determine whether any improvements to the process may be warranted. FINRA will make the results of this review public. As set forth in part in  FINRA's By-Laws Article IX: Committees:
 
Audit Committee
Sec. 5.  (a) The Board shall appoint an Audit Committee. The Audit Committee shall consist of four or five Governors, none of whom shall be officers or employees of the Corporation. The Audit Committee shall include at least two Public Governors. A Public Governor shall serve as Chair of the Committee. An Audit Committee member shall hold office for a term of one year. . . .

The FINRA Audit Committee is appointed by the FINRA Board of Governors. Of course, I have long argued that FINRA's Board is a gerrymandered disgrace that is, at times, lackluster and lackadaisical; so, y'know, I'm just not all that encouraged to learn that a law firm hired by a committee appointed by FINRA's Board is likely to further any overdue Wall Street reforms. Why did it take a scathing Decision in Brian Leggett and Bryson Holdings, LLC, Petitioners, v. Wells Fargo Clearing Services, LLC d/b/a Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC and Jay Windsor Pickett III, Respondents (Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, 2019CV328949 / January 25, 2022) to prompt FINRA's somnolent Audit Committee on February 18, 2022, to investigate festering rumors about FINRA's arbitration forum?  According to FINRA's Standing Committee webpage, the current Audit Committee comprises
https://www.finra.org/about/governance/standing-committees#ac:

https://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-board-governors/lance-drummond

Jack B. Ehnes 
https://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-board-governors/jack-ehnes

https://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-board-governors/christopher-flint

Linde Murphy
https://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-board-governors/linde-murphy

Eileen K. Murray
https://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-board-governors/eileen-murray

And just where, exactly, were those five Audit Committee members the last few years when allegations of improprieties about FINRA's arbitration process were swirling around? 

Notably, FINRA's Chairman of the Board, Eileen K. Murray, is one of the five members of the Audit Committee -- not exactly a disinterested person with a likely burning desire to unearth embarrassing revelations about the self-regulatory-organization that she helms. As to the other sitting Audit Committee members, I see one is "retired," one is listed as a "former" CEO, and two are employed by FINRA member firms --  that's the composition of a robust, independent Audit Committee? Among the more disconcerting disclosures among the various Audit Committee's members' bios are multiple roles on other Boards, as if sitting on FINRA's Board of Governors -- and particularly that Board's Audit Committee -- should not require an exclusive service given that the organization is engaged in regulating the financial services community. 

As to that rousing call to action set out in the FINRA's February 18th Press Release , it was described by the Chair of FINRA's Audit Committee Lance Drummond (whose professional standing is preliminarily set forth on the FINRA website as Public Governor /Retired /Governor Since 2018 / Committees: Audit Committee (Chair), Conflicts Committee, Executive Committee, Management Compensation Committee): 

"We trust Lowenstein's ability to carry out an independent review of the arbitrator selection process administered in this matter and look forward to receiving their findings in the coming months," said Lance Drummond, FINRA Governor and Chair of the Audit Committee.

Seriously Chair Drummond?  That's your direction? You "look forward to receiving their findings in the coming months?" You're merely looking forward -- as in hopeful and desirous but not much more? In the coming months as in maybe six or more or ten or eleven? And, no, I didn't miss the cynical attempt to confine the investigation to "this matter," as in the Leggett arbitration rather than allow the so-called independent, outside law firm free rein to consider the troubling issues raised by the court, no matter where that might take the investigators.

The February 18th FINRA Press Release is a clumsy effort to manage a public relations nightmare. Painfully, lacking in the Press Release is any sense of urgency. What I would have expected -- what industry reform advocates demand -- is accountability on a fast track. For starters, the Audit Committee should not merely express a desultory desire for some kind of findings in "coming months," but underscore the mission-critical aspect of this blot on FINRA's reputation. No, you don't get to go to the old delay-of-game playbook and select the option of a report in a few months and then grant an extension and then deliberate on the recommendations and then publish a sanitized report to the public for extended comment and then undertake a reconciliation effort and then publish a proposed rule and then extend all of that nonsense to a point where FINRA's Chair, and CEO, and all sitting Board members have long-since retired and left the mess to another generation of wannabe self-regulators.

Sadly, the February 18th FINRA Press Release engages in a bit of legerdemain by giving the impression that the desired outcome of the Lowenstein law firm's investigation is some sweeping reform of FINRA's belabored arbitration process; however, that's not what the release actually says:

FINRA announced today that it has hired the Lowenstein Sandler law firm to conduct an independent review of how FINRA Dispute Resolution Services (DRS) complied with its rules, policies and procedures for arbitrator selection in an arbitration proceeding whose award was recently vacated by an Atlanta Superior Court judge.

My guess is that we need to read that opening paragraph in the Press Release very, very literally. The Lowenstein law firm was hired to conduct a review limited to the arbitrator selection in an arbitration proceeding whose award was recently vacated by an Atlanta Superior Court judge -- as in Leggett and only LeggettWhat one would have expected from FINRA's Audit Committee would have been a explicit order -- a clear-cut demand -- that the Lowenstein law firm immediately initiate an investigation into the "arbitrator selection process," and not just limited to "this matter" (Leggett) as is stated in the Release by both FINRA's CEO and the Audit Committee's Chair. At a minimum, Audit Committee Chair Drummond should have promised that all stops will be pulled out to complete said investigation and to submit a FINAL REPORT to the Audit Committee within no more than 90 days. Chair Drummond should have made it clear that he will move heaven and earth and make all financial resources available to Lowenstein in a palpable attempt to purge even a hint of conflict from FINRA's arbitration selection process. Instead, we get tepid. We get trust. We get looking forward. We get coming months.


Federal Register Volume 64, Number 198 (Thursday, October 14, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55793-55796]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-26793]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-41971; File No. SR-NASD-99-21]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving a Proposed Rule 
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. To 
Create a Dispute Resolution Subsidiary

September 30, 1999.
    On April 26, 1999, the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. ("NASD'' or "Association''), through its wholly owned regulatory 
subsidiary, NASD Regulation, Inc. ("NASD Regulation''), submitted to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission''), pursuant to 
section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act'') 1 
and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule change to create a 
dispute resolution subsidiary. The proposed rule change was published 
for comment in the Federal Register on June 17, 1999.3 The Commission 
received one comment letter on the proposal from the Securities 
Industry Association ("SIA'').4 This order approves the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    2 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    3 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41510 (June 10, 
1999), 64 FR 32575.
    4 Letter from Stephen G. Sneeringer, Chairman of the 
Arbitration Committee, SIA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, 
Commission, dated July 8, 1999 ("SIA Letter'').
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I. Description of the Proposal

    The Association is proposing (i) to create a dispute resolution 
subsidiary, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. ("NASD Dispute 
Resolution''), to handle dispute resolution programs; (ii) to adopt by-
laws for the subsidiary; and (iii) to make conforming amendments to the 
Plan of Allocation and Delegation of Functions by NASD to Subsidiaries 
("Delegation Plan''), the NASD Regulation By-Laws, and the Rules of 
the Association.

A. Background

    The Association's arbitration and mediation programs were operated 
by the NASD Arbitration Department until 1996, when those functions 
were moved to NASD Regulation following a corporate reorganization. 
This reorganization in part grew out of recommendations of a Select 
Committee formed by the NASD and made up of individuals with 
significant experience in the securities industry and NASD governance 
("the Rudman Committee'').5 The Rudman Committee reviewed the 
Association's arbitration and mediation programs from December 1994 
through August 1995. The Rudman Report was issued in September 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5 Report of the NASD Select Committee on Structure and 
Governance to the NASD Board of Governors (September 1995) ("Rudman 
Report'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In September 1994, the NASD established the Arbitration Policy Task 
Force, headed by David S. Ruder, former Chairman of the SEC ("the 
Ruder Task Force''), to study NASD arbitration and recommend 
improvements. The Ruder Task Force, composed of eight persons with 
various backgrounds in the area of securities arbitration, met from the 
Fall of 1994 to January 1996, when its Report was issued.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6 Report of the Arbitration Policy Task force to the Board of 
Governors National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (January 
1996) ("Ruder Report'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Both the Rudman Committee and the Ruder Task Force made 
recommendations that affected the arbitration program. The Rudman 
Committee recommended that the NASD reorganize as a parent corporation 
with two relatively autonomous and strong operating subsidiaries, 
independent of one another. The resulting enterprise would consist of 
NASD, Inc., as parent, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq'') as

[[Page 55794]]

one subsidiary to operate Nasdaq, and a new subsidiary, NASD 
Regulation, Inc., to regulate the broker-dealer members of the NASD.7 
The Ruder Report recommended that the dispute resolution program be 
housed either in the parent or in NASD Regulation.8 The Arbitration 
Department was placed in NASD Regulation in early 1996 based on the 
recommendation of the Rudman Committee,9 and the name of the 
department was changed to the Office of Dispute Resolution ("ODR'') 
shortly thereafter, to reflect the full range of dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
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    7 Rudman Report at R-8.
    8 Ruder Report at 151-52.
    9 Rudman Report at R-8.
. . .

You notice the dates referenced in the above SEC Order? The Ruder Task Force and the Rudman Select Committee started their work in 1994. We got 1995 reports. We got 1996 reviews. Then we got more reports and recommendations and proposals. It was only in 1999, however, that the Ruder/Rudman work actually coalesced into the above SEC Order. If that's the course upon which FINRA has now embarked per the Lowenstein law firm's investigation, it may take until 2027 before anything of substance manifests. Which, like I noted above, may be the whole plan. Certainly, FINRA's Board of Governors doesn't give a damn.