The indictment accuses attorney DAVID SARGENT of obtaining material, non-public information from CHRISTOPHER KLUNDT, a management-level employee of the company and a friend since college. The information pertained to the company's 2020 first-quarter earnings, which Klundt knew would be strong based on internal meetings he had attended, the indictment alleges. After receiving the information from Klundt, Sargent purchased numerous shares and call options of the company's stock ahead of the earnings announcement and then sold them shortly thereafter, the indictment states. In the interim, the company's stock price increased. Sargent made approximately $110,000 from the trades, the charges allege.
days before the May 4 earnings release, David Sargent, a Chicago-area lawyer, purchased Chegg stock and options on the basis of material, non-public information obtained from his close friend and former business associate, Christopher Klundt, then an employee of Chegg. According to the complaint, Klundt attended a non-public, internal Chegg meeting on May 1 during which Chegg senior management discussed what would be disclosed in Chegg's upcoming May 4 earnings release. The complaint alleges that almost immediately after the meeting, Klundt called Sargent, and, within an hour of that call, Sargent began purchasing $40,000 worth of Chegg stock and call options. As alleged, Sargent sold these securities after the earnings release, generating more than $110,000 in profits.
From February 2016 through November 2021, E*TRADE failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system, including written procedures, reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and with applicable FINRA rules, related to detecting potentially manipulative trading by its customers. As a result, E*TRADE violated FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010.
During the period December 2016 through November 2021, E*TRADE used multiple surveillance reports to identify potential wash trades and prearranged trades by its customers. Certain of these reports, however, used parameters that significantly restricted their ability to detect such trading, particularly in lower priced and thinly traded securities (which may be more easily affected by manipulative trading). For example, the firm employed a surveillance report to identify potential wash sales, which it defined as "one or more transactions where there is no change in beneficial ownership." The surveillance system however, flagged trades that met this definition only if the total principal value of the trade was more than $1,000, regardless of the price of the underlying security. Also, the firm's surveillance reports would not detect either a potential wash sale or prearranged trade if the two sides of the transaction were executed more than one second apart, even though wash trades and manipulative prearranged trades could be executed more than one second apart.. . .For example, in February 2017, the firm revised its primary marking-the-close surveillance report to only identify orders and trades that were entered and executed in the last minute of the trading day. This restriction prevented the firm from identifying instances of potential marking-the-close activity, particularly in lower priced and thinly traded securities, which occurred prior to that time. The firm also added three additional parameters to this surveillance report: (1) an aggregate end-of-day position exceeding $10,000 for all accounts in a household; (2) a total execution volume greater than one percent of the security's 30-day average daily volume (ADV); and (3) an execution volume of 20 percent or more as a percentage of the customer's position. Importantly, as modified, the surveillance report would only flag a potential instance of marking-theclose if all three of these factors were present simultaneously. As restricted, the surveillance report was not a reasonable method for identifying potential marking-the-close activity. . . .
In 2020, FINRA and the CE Council embarked on the biggest transformation of the continuing education program in 25 years. And in the months ahead, those major changes are going into effect.On this episode, we hear from Patricia Monterosso of FINRA's Credentialing, Registration, Education and Disclosure team and Elizabeth Hansen, the 2021 CE Council Chair, about what firms and reps can expect and why these changes will have such a big impact.
[C]laimant provided important, new information that prompted Commission staff to open an investigation into the alleged misconduct; participated in voluntary interviews and provided additional information; and that certain charges in the Covered Action were directly based on Claimant's information.
[C]laimant alerted the Commission to the on-going fraud, in part, prompting the opening of a new investigation into the alleged conduct, gave testimony to the Commission staff, and provided numerous documents that assisted the staff in its investigation, saving Commission staff time and resources. There also have been minimal collections to date in the matter.
[(i)] Claimant provided important new information that prompted Commission staff to open an investigation into the alleged misconduct; (ii) Claimant provided substantial, ongoing assistance, including participating in voluntary interviews with Commission staff and providing voluminous important documents, and (iii) the charges brought by the Commission were based in significant part on conduct that was the subject of the information provided by Claimant.
[C]laimant provided significant information that alerted Commission staff to an ongoing fraud, prompting the opening of the investigation. Claimant also provided critical documents and participated in post-tip conversations with Commission staff that helped advance the investigation.