10 Foreign Nationals Charged In Years-Long, Multimillion-Dollar Investment And Impersonation Scheme / The Defendants Operated Boiler Rooms in Multiple Countries to Defraud Victims Around the World of Millions of Dollars by Impersonating Prominent Investment Firms and Individuals (DOJ Release)SEC Obtains Default Judgment Against Russian National for Defrauding Investors Out of Millions of Dollars in Phony Certificates of Deposit Scam (SEC Release)
[R]ege and his company SwapStar Capital, LLC solicited Rege's friends, neighbors, and other referrals to be the defendants' investment advisory clients. Rege and SwapStar allegedly misrepresented to their clients that client money would be invested in securities for guaranteed returns. According to the SEC's complaint, Rege and SwapStar instead used client money to pay fictitious gains to other clients, to return original investment amounts to other clients, and to pay for some of Rege's personal expenses.The complaint alleges that Rege engaged in the alleged misconduct even after the SEC had barred him, in a 2019 SEC order, from associating with an investment adviser and ordered him to cease and desist from further violations of certain anti-fraud provisions in the Advisers Act. The complaint alleges that Rege acted as an investment adviser in violation of the bar against him. Further, according to the SEC's complaint, Rege failed to disclose to his advisory clients that he had been barred from associating with an investment adviser.
[D]efendants fraudulently solicited individuals to lend or invest money based on material misrepresentations, including that such funds would be invested in securities, that lenders and investors would receive a fixed monthly, quarterly, or annual return, in some cases as high as 40% to 60%, and that lenders and investors could redeem their funds immediately or on short notice. The complaint further alleges that the defendants then used a portion of the solicited funds to actively trade commodity interests through accounts the defendants owned, or accounts that were nominally owned by Rege's spouse but controlled by Rege. The complaint also alleges that the defendants misappropriated some of the solicited funds for their personal benefit, including to pay for personal expenses and to pay returns to other account holders in a manner akin to a Ponzi scheme. In addition, the complaint alleges that Rege failed to disclose that he was barred for at least three years from trading any commodity interests under the 2019 consent order.
In addition, the complaint alleges that Rege violated the 2019 consent order by continuing to trade commodity interests on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-214
The SEC's complaint alleges that, since at least December 2019, Gallagher used his Twitter handle, @AlexDelarge6553, to make thousands of tweets encouraging his numerous followers to buy stocks in which Gallagher had secretly amassed holdings. As alleged, Gallagher would then sell those stocks at inflated prices, while he continued to recommend others buy them -never disclosing that he was selling the stocks.
Beginning in at least 2015, NICHOLAS RUSSELL JAMES GILLIE, NEOPHYTOS GEORGIOU, URS MEISTERHANS, SCOTT STEVEN NEILSON, LIAM JAMES SMOUT, DANIEL NIELSEN, BRENDA LAVERTY, ANDREW GEORGIOU, THOMAS ANDREW KENNY, and JAKE MARDELL participated in a sophisticated international mass-marketing investment fraud scheme to defraud English-speaking investors from around the world of millions of dollars, and to launder the fraud proceeds and distribute those proceeds among the conspirators. NEOPHYTOS GEORGIOU, who owns bars and restaurants in Cyprus, financed the costs of the investment fraud scheme, which was orchestrated by GILLIE, his longstanding partner in Cyprus. MEISTERHANS was a key "banker" - that is, money launderer - in the scheme, who laundered victim funds through bank accounts in the United States and several other countries.
As part of the investment fraud scheme, conspirators purported to be employees of successful financial investment firms and took sophisticated steps to convince victims of the firms' existence and legitimacy. Those steps commonly included impersonating real financial investment firms, creating fraudulent websites that appeared to be associated with the real firms, creating fraudulent email addresses that appeared to be associated with employees of the real firms, publishing fraudulent news articles relating to the fake firms and their supposed investments, utilizing a widely-used internet search engine to disseminate scheme-related online advertisements, creating fraudulent investment-related contracts and other financial and legal documents, and using the names, titles, signatures, email addresses, and likenesses of real individuals prominent in business and finance. Employing those tactics, among others, and through hard-sell telemarketing calls and emails with victim-investors orchestrated from so-called "boiler rooms" located in Cyprus, Spain, Romania, and Cambodia, the conspirators convinced victims to transfer funds to one or more bank accounts under the conspirators' control (the "Victim Depository Accounts") for what the victims understood to be investments in various companies - that is, the purchase of company shares. In reality, however, the conspirators' purported financial investment firms were fake, the purported share purchases were fraudulent, and the money sent by victims was never returned. The combined losses of victims exceeded $6 million.
Rather than being used to make investments, the funds that victims transferred to the Victim Depository Accounts were sent back to the conspirators by individuals sometimes referred to by conspirators as "bankers" (the "Bankers"), who were in fact responsible for laundering the proceeds of the investment fraud scheme. For example, fraud proceeds were at times transferred from a Banker to bank accounts held in the names of individuals who do not actually exist, such as "James William Carter" and "Jonathan Timothy Turner," but in whose names the conspirators had opened bank accounts using fake United Kingdom passports and other documents. The fraud proceeds were then distributed among the conspirators, as salary or commission, for their participation in the investment fraud scheme.One component of the years-long investment fraud scheme involved the impersonation, in or about 2019, of a New York-based private investment fund (the "New York Fund") founded by an internationally renowned billionaire investor (the "Founder"). While impersonating the New York Fund, conspirators fraudulently induced victim-investors from Australia, Europe, and elsewhere to enter into various purported investments, including the supposed purchase of "pre-IPO" shares of a successful and relatively young international company that did not have its shares listed on a public stock exchange ("Company‑1").
From August 2016 through August 2017, Melhado conspired with Jamere Hill-Birdsong, of Camden, and others, to defraud a Mount Laurel, New Jersey, bank. Hill-Birdsong worked inside the call center and recruited other call center employees to participate in the scheme by stealing the identities and account information of customers who called into the bank's call center. The conspirator bank employees would then take photographs or screenshots of the bank customers' account information and signatures and would send that information to Hill-Birdsong and Melhado. The conspirators then had phony identification documents made in the names of the bank customers, and used various runners to go into bank branches and make unauthorized cash withdrawals. The conspirators also used the stolen identity information to conduct unauthorized online transfers of monies from the customer's accounts.
[F]rom August 2018 through January 2021, Vick represented herself to investors as a consistently successful options trader and promised investors exorbitant investment returns. As alleged, however, Vick's options trading resulted in a volatile mix of gains and losses, and she had never generated the consistent profits necessary to pay investors the returns she promised. According to the complaint, after suffering significant trading losses in early 2020, Vick began making Ponzi-like payments to investors and misappropriated approximately $570,150 of investor funds.
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2021/lr25247.htm
[T]he scheme involved purchasing internet ads that targeted investors who were searching for CDs with above-market rates. The ads allegedly included links to phony websites, which falsely claimed that the firms offering the CDs were members of FINRA and the FDIC, and that deposits were FDIC-insured. The complaint alleged that, when investors called the phone number on the websites, an "account executive" impersonating a real registered representative directed investors to wire funds to so-called "clearing" partners. These purported clearing partners were allegedly entities used by Sotnikov and other participants in the scheme to launder and misappropriate millions of dollars in investor funds. The complaint also alleged that several relief defendants received misappropriated investor funds, including Sotnikov's wife, Natalia Aleksandrovna Mazitova, and several entities they controlled.
Respondent understands that this settlement includes a finding that she willfully omitted to state a material fact on a Form U4, and that under Section 3(a)(39)(F) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Article III, Section 4 of FINRA's By-Laws, this omission makes her subject to a statutory disqualification with respect to association with a member.
In 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government initiated several programs to assist small businesses, including the COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program, which was administered by the SBA. In approximately June 2020, Anderson submitted an application to the SBA for an Economic Injury Disaster Loan. Before submitting the application, Anderson did not review the Economic Injury Disaster Loan program requirements to determine her eligibility, nor did she review any instructions concerning the application. Anderson completed and submitted the application using her cell phone and without referring to any documentation.
In the application, Anderson recklessly misrepresented that: (i) she was the owner of a real estate business; (ii) the business had earned revenue and incurred costs in the 12 months prior to January 31, 2020; and (iii) the real estate business had ten employees. Anderson, then a registered representative of J.P. Morgan with no disclosed outside business activities, did not then own any such real estate business or have any other business eligible for an Economic Injury Disaster Loan from the SBA.
Based on Anderson's misrepresentations, the SBA provided her with a $10,000 Economic Injury Disaster Loan advance but denied the loan application. Anderson legally formed a real estate business on July 21, 2020 and used some of the $10,000 she received from the SBA to pay for expenses relating to the business. To date, Anderson has not repaid the $10,000 to the SBA
Based on the foregoing, Anderson violated FINRA Rule 2010.
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On April 28, 2016, the State of Louisiana filed a tax lien against Anderson for approximately $3,000. Anderson was aware of the lien at or around the time it was filed, but did not amend her Form U4 to disclose the lien until October 17, 2017, approximately 18 months after she first learned of the lien.
In addition, between September 2015 and February 1, 2017, Anderson reached seven compromises with creditors totaling approximately $9,000. Anderson was aware of each of these compromises with creditors but did not disclose them on her Form U4 at any time when she was registered with J.P. Morgan Securities between July 2015 and March 2018. Anderson disclosed them on her Form U4 when she again registered through J.P. Morgan Securities in August 2018.By willfully failing to timely amend her Form U4, Anderson violated Article V, Section 2(c) of FINRA's By-Laws and FINRA Rules 1122 and 2010.
http://www.brokeandbroker.com/6132/finra-ubs-yes/
http://www.brokeandbroker.com/6122/finra-equitable-awc/