[K]ang enticed investors to invest their money into stock issued by his company, Safety Capital Management, Inc. ("Safety Capital"), which did business as FOREXNPOWER. The investors were told their investments would be pooled by Kang and others to conduct foreign exchange trading, or to expand the FOREXNPOWER business. Kang falsely promised investors outsized returns at minimal risk. Ultimately, nearly all of the money that was invested in Safety Capital stock was misappropriated by Kang and his co-conspirators. Kang used some of the money stolen from clients to pay for advertisements targeting additional investors and promoting FOREXNPOWER's outsized trading returns based on a algorithmic trading method that did not actually exist. Kang's co-defendant John Won is awaiting trial.
From December 2012 to September 2013, Graham represented himself as the owner, chief executive, chairman, manager, and principal member of dozens of corporate entities purporting to do business under an umbrella organization, Vulcan Capital Corp. (Vulcan). Graham held himself out as a highly successful financier who had vast experience sponsoring complex energy and natural resource projects and other investment deals. In connection with one such investment that Graham and a Vulcan entity sponsored, one victim (Victim-1) invested more than $2 million with Graham, relying on Graham's misrepresentations and omissions regarding the investment. The investigation revealed that Graham misappropriated substantial amounts of Victim-1's investment money and used it for his own personal benefit and enrichment - including international vacations, private school tuition for his children, and other personal amenities - instead of the investment purpose that Graham had marketed. Graham caused multiple victims to lose more than $2.6 million.Graham also participated in a scheme to defraud merchant processing institutions through fraudulent credit card transactions. From December 2017 to February 2018, Graham used at least one payment processing platform to process fraudulent charges on stolen credit card numbers that he obtained. After the payment processing platform credited Graham's account with the payments requested, Graham quickly transferred or caused to be transferred the fraudulently obtained money to other accounts before the victim institutions could act. When requested by the victim payment processing company to provide supporting documentation, Graham submitted false documentation, including fabricated invoices and credit card authorization forms, fabricated e-mails, forged signatures, altered bank statements, and other false and fraudulent information. This scheme resulted in tens of thousands of dollars of losses and the misappropriation of multiple victims' personal identification information.From February 2017 to June 2018, Graham conspired with others to defraud victim institutions and individuals of millions of dollars through a business email compromise scheme. Members of the conspiracy sent fraudulent e-mail communications to victims who were scheduled to make substantial outgoing wire transfers to third parties. These fraudulent e-mails created the appearance that they had been sent by the intended third-party recipients of the scheduled payments when, in fact, they were sent by members of the conspiracy. The fraudulent emails requested the victims to reroute the scheduled payments to different bank accounts, which Graham and his conspirators controlled. In one instance, a fraudulent email successfully induced one victim unknowingly to reroute a payment of more than $650,000 to a bank account that Graham controlled. Upon receiving the funds, Graham transferred or caused to be transferred substantial portions of those funds to other accounts that he controlled, and which he used and intended to use for his own personal benefit. Graham and his conspirators attempted to defraud multiple victims of at least $6 million.
[F]rom 2015 through 2018, Elstun fraudulently overcharged his advisory clients by charging undisclosed fees, including higher advisory fees than clients had agreed to pay, and by applying the advisory fee to non-advisory assets, including bank account balances, equity in homes and other real estate, and the value of vehicles, thereby increasing the fees charged to those accounts. The complaint alleges that Elstun also misled advisory clients about his trading in high risk, daily leveraged and/or inverse exchange-traded funds (ETFs) by failing to disclose the substantial risks of buying and holding these products, and by inaccurately representing that the products functioned as "insurance" or a "hedge" for their portfolios when his trading strategy for these products actually created significant risk for clients. The complaint further alleges that Elstun made unsuitable and risky investments in daily leveraged and/or inverse ETFs that were inconsistent with Elstun's clients' investment objectives and risk tolerances. As alleged in the complaint, as a result of Elstun's ETF trading, those clients lost millions.
The SEC previously charged Jimerson for his alleged role in a scheme to conceal that Lucent's core business model was a sham in connection with the company's acquisition by another manufacturer in 2013. According to the SEC's complaint, Lucent routinely lied to its customers and falsified its certifications of test data to show that its products complied with customer specifications, including in important areas such as fire-retardant measures. Jimerson allegedly hid Lucent's fraudulent practices, made misrepresentations to the company that acquired Lucent, and continued the fraud, including by lying to the Commission's staff, even after the sale of that company.
Holcomb became Customer P's broker of record in early 2015, after her previous broker left the firm. By the end of 2016, Holcomb understood that Customer P was not financially secure and suffered from serious health problems. Nevertheless, between November 2016 and June 2017, when Holcomb left MMLIS, Holcomb borrowed at least $31,420 from Customer P. To date, he has only repaid $1,007. Customer P was not a member of Holcomb's immediate family, and Holcomb never notified or sought preapproval from MMLIS before borrowing from her as required.
Cambridge failed to reasonably supervise representatives' recommendations of an alternative mutual fund-the LJM Preservation & Growth Fund (LJM).1 Cambridge permitted the sale of LJM on its platform without conducting reasonable due diligence and without a sufficient understanding of its risks and features, including the fact that the fund pursued a risky strategy that relied, in part, on purchasing uncovered options. Cambridge also lacked a reasonable supervisory system to review representatives' LJM recommendations. Cambridge representatives sold more than $18 million in LJM to customers. LJM's value dropped 80% during an extreme volatility event in February 2018 and the fund ultimately liquidated and closed, resulting in millions of dollars in losses for Cambridge's customers. By virtue of the foregoing, Cambridge violated NASD Rule 3010 and FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010. . . .= = = = =Footnote 1: Ticker symbols were LJMIX, LJMCX and LJMAX
Between August 17, 2016, and February 8, 2018, SAI failed to reasonably supervise representatives' recommendations of an alternative mutual fund-the LJM Preservation & Growth Fund (LJM).1 SAI permitted the sale of LJM on its platform without conducting reasonable due diligence and without a sufficient understanding of its risks and features, including the fact that the fund pursued a risky strategy that relied, in part, on purchasing uncovered options. SAI also lacked a reasonable supervisory system to review representatives' LJM recommendations. SAI representatives sold more than $616,000 in LJM to thirty-three customers. LJM's value dropped 80% during an extreme volatility event in February 2018 and the fund ultimately liquidated and closed, resulting in hundreds of thousands in losses for SAI's customers. By virtue of the foregoing, SAI violated FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010.= = = = =Footnote 1: Ticker symbols were LJMIX, LJMCX and LJMAX.
FINRA Censures and Fines Securities America Over Outsourced Onboarding (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / March 2, 2021)http://www.brokeandbroker.com/5714/finra-securities-america/BrokeAndBroker.com Blog publisher, Bill Singer, is no fan of Wall Street's version of self regulation, as spearheaded by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). At best, FINRA comes off as a glorified trade group on steroids; at worst, as a lap dog for its larger member firms. Pointedly, the industry's small fry -- the mom-and-pop brokerages and their hundreds of thousands of associated persons -- never quite seem to get the mercy, the benefit of the doubt, or the concessions that seem afforded to the industry's big fish. In today's featured FINRA regulatory settlement, it could be that FINRA has pulled its punches because of Covid. It could be that what's a "relevant" prior disciplinary history is open to broad interpretation. Maybe FINRA got it right and Bill is being overly sensitive. So . . . why don't you take a smell and see if you would eat this sushi?
A Matter of RelevanceThe 2021 AWC asserts that Securities America "does not have any relevant disciplinary history."Really?No relevant prior disciplinary history at all?And by what FINRA guidelines was that determination made?52 Final Regulatory Events on BrokerCheckAs of March 2, 2021, FINRA's online BrokerCheck discloses that Securities America has 52 "Final" regulatory events. Of those 52 final regulatory events, the oldest goes back to 1992 and the most recent (other than the 2021 AWC cited in this article) is In the Matter of Securities America, Inc., Respondent (FINRA AWC 2016048243101 / September 7, 2018) (the "Securities America 2018 AWC")https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/fda_documents/2016048243101%20Securities%20America%2C%20Inc.%20CRD%2010205%20AWC%20va%20%282019-1563443361036%29.pdfdatedIn the Securities America 2018 AWC, FINRA imposed upon Securities America a Censure and $175,000. As set forth in the 2018 AWC's "Overview":Between August 4, 2014 and January 28, 2016 (the "Relevant Period"), SAl failed to establish, maintain and enforce a supervisory system and written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that representatives' recommendations of variable annuities complied with applicable securities laws and regulations and FINRA Rules. As a result, SAI violated FINRA Rules 2330(d), and (e), NASD Rule 3010 (for conduct before December 1, 2014), FINRA Rule 3110 (for conduct on and after December 1, 2014) and FINRA Rule 2010.How could the failed supervisory system cited in the Securities America 2018 AWC not be a prior, relevant issue for disclosure in the Securities America 2021 AWC?I admit that the Securities America 2018 AWC involved recommendations of variable annuities and the 2021 AWC involved the onboarding of new reps BUT the underlying failure was that Securities America did not maintain and enforce a supervisory system satisfactory to FINRA -- that's not my conclusion but, to the contrary, the allegations of FINRA in both the 2018 and the 2021 AWCs. Notably, both AWCs alleged violations of the same FINRA Rule 2010.You may argue that in the Securities America 2021 AWC, the issue was that Securities America "caused the other broker-dealers to violate Regulation S-P" and that then triggered the Rule 2010 violation. In contrast, you could point out that the Securities America 2018 AWC involved a failure of supervision, which triggered the Rule 2010 violation. Argue that distinction all you want. You won't convince me. The core issue in the 2021 AWC is NOT what went on at the third-party vendor but whether Securities America had an obligation to monitor -- to supervise -- that outside party's conduct and to maintain reasonable oversight of its onboarding process.As I often note, FINRA has a very odd sense of what is and what isn't a prior "relevant" disciplinary history. See, for example: "For FINRA, Relevant Is A Large Gray Pachyderm" (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / September 9, 2020) http://www.brokeandbroker.com/5401/finra-relevant-wells-fargo/
From October 2014 through April 2017, AISG and Carlson failed to (a) establish, maintain, and enforce a supervisory system, including written supervisory procedures, reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable rules relating to sales of collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs); (b) take reasonable action to ensure that Cioffi-the principal to whom Carlson had delegated responsibility for supervising Representative A and his CMO recommendations-was properly executing that responsibility; (c) reasonably respond to red flags indicating that Representative A's CMO recommendations were unsuitable; and (d) reasonably supervise discretionary trading and accounts held by senior investors. As a result, AISG and Carlson violated FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010 and NASD Rules 3010 and 2510(c).During the same period, Cioffi failed to reasonably supervise Representative A and to reasonably respond to red flags of unsuitable CMO recommendations. As a result, Cioffi violated FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010 and NASD Rule 3010.