JPMorgan Chase said it was instituting mandatory diversity and inclusion training for its managers after a December New York Times article detailed racial discrimination at a branch in Arizona.The bank, which admitted to failures tied to the report in January, said Tuesday in a staff memo it had targeted several areas where it could improve its culture and processes to prevent more incidents from happening. That includes diversity training for all of the bank's 257,000 employees, with special training for managers, the New York-based lender said.
Zschocher joined CUNA as a Non-Registered Fingerprinted Person in the position of Coordinator in March 2019. As a condition of her employment, Zschocher was required to successfully complete several licensing and qualifications exams, including the SIB Exam, by July 2019.Zschocher first attempted the SIE Exam on May 16, 2019, and a score of 70% or above was required to pass. Zschocher failed the exam and advised the Firm of that failure on May 20, 2019. At that time, Zschocher orally represented to CUNA that she had received a score of 69%, which was not accurate.Zschocher attempted the SIE Exam again on June 24, 2019. She failed this exam, receiving a score of 48%. That same day, Zschocher informed her CUNA supervisor that she had again failed the exam, and was instructed to bring her printed score report to the office the next day. Prior to meeting with her supervisor, however, Zschocher created a modified version of her official score report for that exam, reflecting an inaccurate score of 69%. On June 27, Zschocher provided this falsified score report to her CUNA supervisor.
In January 2018, Firm Customer EW, an elderly investor, met with Hite and initiated an exchange from a variable annuity to a fixed annuity. EW signed all the transaction related documents to effect the exchange. The documents did not conform to firm guidelines and Hite was required to have the customer sign the documents again and resubmit to the firm.Subsequently, Hite attempted to contact EW but was not successful in reaching him. Rather than having customer EW sign the documents again, on March 8, 2018, Hite forged EW's handwritten signature on a hold harmless agreement, one of the transaction related documents. On March 28, 2018, Hite also electronically forged EW's signature on three additional transaction-related documents to effect the exchange. These transaction documents included the Fixed Annuity Application, Client Profile and Policy Disclosure form, and the Replacement of Life Insurance or Annuities form. Hite's forgeries are aggravated by the fact that, in order to authenticate the electronic signatures, Hite re-created an e-mail address previously used by EW and used it to verify the forged electronic signatures. Unbeknownst to Hite, EW had passed away on February 22, 2018, prior to the forgeries. Although EW had previously signed these documents, Hite was not authorized to sign for EW. Hite submitted the transaction related documents to the Firm for processing as originals signed by EW.
On three occasions between December 2011 and August 2017, while registered through LPL, Lamkin borrowed a total of $1,265,000 from a longtime friend who was also an LPL customer whose account he serviced. The first loan, which was made in December 2011 in the amount of $740,000, was made via a promissory note dated December 30, 2011 signed by Lamkin's wife and secured by a mortgage dated December 30, 2011 identifying Lamkin and his wife as the borrowers and signed by both. That loan has been repaid in full. The second loan, in the amount of $250,000, was negotiated between Lamkin and the customer and memorialized by a note signed by Lamkin's wife on April 1, 2017. The third loan, in the amount of $275,000, was made to a limited liability company ("LLC") of which Lamkin was a member and initially was memorialized by a note signed by Lamkin and his business partner in the LLC on August 31, 2017. While the second and third loans have not been repaid in full, they are currently in repayment.Throughout the relevant period, LPL's written supervisory procedures prohibited registered representatives from borrowing money from a customer unless the customer was a family member. The customer was not Lamkin's family member, and Lamkin did not seek or obtain prior approval of any of the loans from LPL.Additionally, in annual compliance questionnaires completed in 2012 and 2017, Lamkin falsely affirmed that neither he nor "any related person or entity" had "borrowed or loaned any money or securities from or to another individual or entity.