For several years, ORLEAN and his codefendants operated a fraudulent scheme in which a salesman named "Mike Palmer" would call elderly persons on the phone and offer them what he claimed was a time-sensitive opportunity to buy stock in certain companies. In fact, there was no "Mike Palmer," and the salesman was actually Vladimir Ziskind or Kevin Weinzoff, co-conspirators of the defendant who were taking turns using the fake alias. The purported time-sensitive investment opportunity was also fabricated by the defendants, as the company in which they solicited investments were actually companies under their control. In one intercepted phone call conversation, Ziskind described to KEITH ORLEAN his strategy for a successful investor sales pitch as: "You ram it down their fucking throat." In another intercepted call between Ziskind and ORLEAN, upon learning that a particular victim investor died, Ziskind remarked: "I knew I should have pulled the last $10,000 out of him."The most recent version of the defendants' phony sales pitch included false representations about an impending initial public offering, or "IPO," for their company, Digital Donations Technologies, Inc. For example, in April 2018, one of the defendants assured a victim investor that "our company is doing great," that the company had an offer for an IPO valued at approximately $300 million, and that defendant KEITH ORLEAN was considering a private sale of the company for more than $1.5 billion. In truth, however, the defendants knew that the company had little or no actual commercial value and that no such IPO or sale was taking place.The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") estimates that since April 2014, the defendants have convinced more than approximately 57 persons, many of whom were elderly, to purchase stock in companies controlled by one or more of the defendants based on false representations. During the period of the conspiracy, the defendants successfully solicited more than $2 million in stock purchases from victims.
From at least January 2016 through December 2018, the defendants participated in a fraudulent scheme that most commonly operated as follows: First, co-conspirators impersonated automotive dealers and collectors and claimed to be selling classic cars on various well-known internet auction and trading websites. Victims responding to the ads were in fact corresponding with a fraud scheme participant. After the victims and co-conspirators came to terms on a sale price, including down payment and shipping costs, victims were next directed to purported automotive transportation companies and were told that these companies would accept payment and transport the cars. These companies were in fact shell corporations established by the conspiracy to help perpetrate the fraud, whose corporate bank accounts were established and controlled by the defendants and co-conspirators, awaiting wired funds from the fraud's victims. After victims had wired payment, the defendants and co-conspirators went to the banks to drain the victim's funds, often starting the same day payment had been transmitted, withdrawing from different bank branches in numerous withdrawals on the same day, and withdrawing in denominations that were varied and often kept to an amount that they believed would prevent the financial institutions from recording and reporting the fraud. The defendants and other co-conspirators then sent the fraud proceeds outside the United States to Eastern European countries, from where the defendants and many of their co-conspirators originated. Some of the defendants maintained managerial roles, recruiting co-conspirators to participate and providing directions and victim information to scheme participants once the co-conspirators were inside the United States. Victims never received the goods they believed they had purchased, and many were unable to recover their money or were left paying loans for cars that were never truly for sale.APSKALNS and PIRINS served as managers in this scheme, who, in addition to opening bank accounts of their own that received victim funds, directed and coordinated the activities of cells of co-conspirators in the United States. APSKALNS and PIRINS continued their criminal activity and management role when they left the United States and returned to Latvia.APSKALNS and PIRINS were arrested in Latvia in November 2018. At the time of their arrest, evidence recovered from APSKALNS revealed that he was continuing to direct co-conspirators until the time of his arrest. This information led to the arrest of four co-conspirators in the United States as they attempted to flee the United States from John F. Kennedy airport. APSKALNS and PIRINS were extradited to the United States in December 2018.
DIVER was the chief operating officer ("COO") of a Manhattan-based asset management company ("Company-1") that offers its customers investment planning and wealth management services. As COO, DIVER's responsibilities included overseeing the company's payroll and billing functions.Beginning in 2011 and continuing into December 2018, DIVER fraudulently caused Company-1's third-party payroll vendor to pay him salary significantly beyond his authorized salary and bonus. Over that period, DIVER caused over $4.5 million to be routed to his personal checking account above and beyond his approved compensation.In 2017, DIVER began to also defraud Company-1's clients. Typically, Company-1 billed its clients quarterly, in most cases having been authorized by the clients to deduct its investment advisory fees directly from their custodial accounts. DIVER began to cause an employee to run the billing process, which was based on a fixed percentage of the assets the clients had under the company's management, at off-cycle intervals as to certain clients in addition to the regular quarterly intervals at which it billed legitimately. These billings were not accompanied by any notice. The clients affected by this practice therefore had their accounts debited twice, but were only notified of the single legitimate billing in periodic reports and correspondence from the company. DIVER routed the excess funds to his own personal bank accounts through the company's payroll system. Through this mechanism, DIVER defrauded the clients of over $700,000.In December 2018, certain clients noticed the overbilling and complained to Company-1's president, who confronted DIVER. DIVER admitted to both fraudulent practices, stating that the funds he had stolen were consumed by his own "wild" spending. More recently, law enforcement agents recorded a conversation in which DIVER acknowledged having defrauded the company of $4.5 million through the payroll fraud and certain clients of over $700,000 through the billing fraud.
[B]etween October 2014 and November 2018, he solicited victims in the Baton Rouge area and elsewhere to invest with his company, WBI Associates, Inc., promising victims large returns in a short time frame. Byers focused his solicitations on older individuals and those who had been victims of prior schemes. He promised his victims that the money would be invested, variously, in gold production, a lottery company, foreign currency, or "dark pools" or "blind pools." Whenever his victims pressed for returns or refunds of their money, Byers gave various excuses for delays - the money was invested overseas, other individuals had to "sign off," or more money needed to be invested before any was paid out. In truth, instead of investing the money as promised, Byers spent the money on personal expenditures, including among others, approximately $10,000 per month in rent for his residence in a Miami hotel, the lease of luxury cars, and gambling in casinos. Byers admitted that he received between $3,500,001 and $9,500,000 as a result of his scheme, $3,000,000 of which he sent to a Swiss bank account he controlled. Byers also admitted that he had two prior federal felony convictions, one of which was for a similar wire fraud scheme.As part of the investigation, the FBI seized several bank accounts controlled by Byers, including the funds in the Swiss bank account. The FBI also seized $260,000 in cash, $230,000 of which was seized from one of his safe deposit boxes, and $30,000 of which was seized from a safe in his residence. Byers' interest in these bank accounts, in the cash, and in other items has been forfeited. All property forfeited to the United States, including the cash and the funds in the bank accounts, will be made available for distribution to all of the victims.
[O]ver $10 million was allegedly sent by victims to accounts controlled by the defendants, who were able to take in excess of $3 million before law enforcement or financial institutions stopped the fraudulent transfers. In a BEC scheme, scammers target businesses and individuals making wire transfer payments, often targeting employees with access to company finances. The scammers trick the employees into making wire transfer payments to bank accounts thought to belong to trusted partners-except the money ends up in accounts controlled by the fraudsters. Sometimes the scammers use computer intrusion techniques to alter legitimate payment request emails, changing the recipient bank accounts. Sometimes they send spoofed emails from email addresses similar to trusted partners.Whatever the BEC method used, the scammers need bank accounts controlled by coconspirators to collect the stolen money. The indictment alleges that the conspirators acquired or controlled dozens of bank accounts opened in the U.S., including in Austin, TX, utilizing fraudulent identification documents, including fraudulent foreign passports in fake names. The indictment alleges that once the funds were fraudulently procured and deposited into these bogus accounts, the defendants worked quickly to withdraw or transfer the funds.The indictment further alleges that some of the conspirators also received funds sent by the victims of romance fraud.
As we engage in our discussions today, I am hoping to learn answers to several questionsFirst, What does the VC community know about the likelihood of future disruptive innovation that could challenge today's technology giants?Second, Are any of today's digital platforms so dominant, with such a capability to restrict access to inputs or to distribution of products, that investors are not willing to develop products that rely on those platformsThird, Where are we in the life cycle of the market for data about how people interact with websites, and with their phones or wearables? We are engaged in a national debate about the value of keeping that information private, but do we have a sense of what that information might be worth in different markets and how consumers may be served by rules that allow the collection and use of that dataFourth, What tools does the VC community use to evaluate the strategic value of a transaction, that we as antitrust enforcers can utilize to think about whether a transaction is premised on creating value for consumers, versus preventing competition?