unsuitability and breach of duty to supervise. The causes of action relate to Claimant's investments in the following commodity based securities: LinnCo, LLC ("LinnCo"); Kinder Morgan, Inc. ("Kinder"); The Williams Companies, Inc. ("Williams"); and Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. ("PCS"), collectively referred to as the "Four Securities." 

This Arbitrator concurs that expungement is well-deserved and agrees in all material respects with the forgoing opinion. As a matter of professionalism, however, he writes to elaborate upon the facts and law supporting his concurrence, because he perceives it is his duty to the judiciary, FINRA, and Claimant's counsel to do so in light of his prior dissents to an order prior to settlement, containing several discovery rulings that were adverse to Claimant, and to the post-settlement order granting the Motion to Intervene to seek expungement herein. 

Additionally, this Arbitrator would have objected -- and if unsuccessful, would have dissented to the clearly inappropriate in terrorem language in paragraph 8 of the June 1 Order that scheduled the expungement hearing -- if the Chair had first shared a draft of it with the Panel for our input (as judicial panels do, and as arbitral panels in this Arbitrator's 20+ years' experience as an arbitrator also do). Presumably, he didn't send us a draft because of inadvertent oversight or distraction, e.g., an emergency or an imminent trip to a location where he would lack internet access). Paragraph 8 was directly contrary to FINRA's rules that not only require Claimants be notified of expungement hearings but that they be invited to participate, not threatened with adverse consequences if they do so. 

Unfortunately, due to unrelated personal circumstances, this Arbitrator did not become aware of the June 1 Order nor of the Memorandum until mid-July and because of the extended lapse of time, coupled with a perceived likelihood of futility in belatedly dissenting in light of his unsuccessful objections to the prior orders, this Arbitrator refrained from dissenting to paragraph 8 of the June 1 Order. 

Considering the clear in terrorem purpose and effect of paragraph 8, it was totally understandable that neither Claimant nor his counsel attended the hearing in person, by phone, or video but relied solely upon the Memorandum. The Memorandum consisted of: a two-page cover letter dated June 29, 2018; an 11- page legal memorandum; a table of exhibits; and 53 pages of exhibits. The Memorandum was identified and introduced on the record by the Chair at the outset of the expungement hearing. . . .

Claimant also asserted in the Memorandum that expungement should additionally be denied pursuant to FINRA Regulatory Notice #17-42. However, the Regulatory Notice was not an existing rule or policy but was only being proposed by FINRA; and to date, it appears that FINRA is either: still reviewing and evaluating the comments and suggestions it received from the SEC and others; or in the process of formulating a revised proposal in response.1 Although the comments from the SEC's Office of the Investor Advocate ("OIA") praised FINRA's efforts and indicated it is "largely supportive of the proposed procedural changes," it did take issue with several of them and offered some suggestions. 

This Arbitrator acknowledges that the comments from the OIA very much shared FINRA's concern that a detailed study had found approximately 80% of all expungement requests have been granted-which suggested to FINRA and the OIAthat the process is not materializing as the "extraordinary" remedy it was intended to be. However, regardless of what those statistics may mean on a composite basis, this panel is obligated to adjudicate this case on the operative facts in this case. We have done so. 

With no disrespect intended, but with due regard to the weight and totality of the evidence, Claimant's assertions of being misled, etc. by Respondent, Marsteller and Bradshaw remind this Arbitrator of the parable about the preacher who, in the midst of a hurricane flooding his city, and a police motorboat coming down his street to urge him to come to the boat and evacuate, responded from his front porch: "NO! I am a man of God. I have faith in the Lord." An hour later, even though the flood waters had continued to rise, and the preacher had climbed of necessity to the second story, when a police motorboat again came down the street and urged him to come aboard and evacuate, the preacher gave the same response. Finally, after another hour of torrential rains, and by now the preacher having had to climb to the roof to keep from drowning, the police sent a helicopter, dropped a rope ladder, and pleaded with him for a third and emphatic final time to climb aboard the helicopter. He again declined; the helicopter left; the floodwaters continue to rise; and he drowned. 

When the preacher got to heaven and met St. Peter at the gates, he asked St. Peter why God had abandoned him and let him drown in view of his long history of living a pious and religious life. St. Peter looked up heaven's file on the preacher and responded incredulously: "What you mean ‘abandoned'? According to our records, God did try to save you. He sent you two motorboats and a helicopter." 

In summary, and with all due respect and credit to Claimant for his lifetime accomplishments, Marsteller and Bradshaw are entitled to expungement because the overwhelming weight of the evidence - not only by a preponderance of the evidence, nor even by clear and convincing evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt - indicates that the claims asserted on behalf of Claimant in the SOC and subsequently are, at the very least, clearly erroneous. Before investing in the Four Securities , Claimant knew well and accepted the inherent risks of investing in equities, especially those dealing with commodities, and that those risks were accentuated that much more when investing on margin. Yet he sought recovery herein as if he had a bona fide insurance claim against his insurance company. 

For all of the forgoing reasons, this Arbitrator is now convinced that this is a case in which expungement should be granted.