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NASDAQ�S ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY FOR CRIMINAL/REGULATORY VIOLATORSWhat
are the ramifications of the NASD's apparent policy of denying NASDAQ listing
status to applicants with control persons possessing significant criminal and
regulatory histories?
One
of the side effects of the 1990s Internet/technology boom was an increase in
young companies goin Future
historians may well conclude that the 1990s Bull Market prompted the
demutualization of the stock markets and further dehomogenized Wall Street�s And
therein arises a question, one fraught with social and ethical dilemmas:can
or should there be a balancing test applied to permit former felons or
individuals with serious regulatory violations a role on the boards or in
management of publicly traded companies? THE
NEED FOR CLARIFICATION On
April 6, 1994, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) filed
a proposed rule change with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)
that was subsequently approved on June 3, 1994 (herein, the �Criteria
Order�).[i]
The express purpose of the NASD proposal was to clarify its discretionary
authority under Schedule D to its By-Laws[ii]
to exclude an issuer from the NASDAQ Stock Market ("NASDAQ") or
require additional or more stringent criteria for inclusion in NASDAQ.[iii]
Why
did the NASD need such clarification? For
most securities professionals the issue seemed to have been fully addressed
nearly twenty years earlier in 1975 when the Commission held In The Matter of
Tassawaythat the NASD is vested with discretionary authority to deny an
issuer's request that its securities be included in NASDAQ and that in
undertaking such considerations the self-regulatory organization�s (SRO)
primary emphasis must be placed on the interests of prospective future
investors.[iv]
However, the majority of listing denials had traditionally been based
upon so-called quantitative issues; e.g., market The
NASD is concerned about an increase in recent years in the number of
applications for inclusion in NASDAQ by issuers that are managed, controlled or
influenced by persons with a history of significant securities or commodities
violations. [Ed: footnote omitted] In particular, the NASD is concerned about
issuers substantially influenced by persons who have previously been the subject
of a significant sanction for violations of state or federal securities laws,
self-regulatory organization ("SRO") rules and regulations, or the
subject of a felony conviction in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities or commodities. The NASD believes that applications from these
issuers for inclusion in NASDAQ reflect a pattern of activity in which persons
with a history of securities or commodities violations seek to continue their
violative conduct in the securities markets through the management, control or
influence of a publicly-held company. The
NASD has indicated that a case-by-case review of issuer applications has
previously resulted in denials of certain applications pursuant to the
"catch-all" provision of Part II, Section 3(a)(3) of Schedule D. [Ed:
footnote omitted][v] ZERO
TOLERANCE In
submitting its proposal, the NASD appears to have taken great pains to preempt
criticism that it sought to impose a blanket prohibition against all former
criminals, tortfeasors, and regulatory violators seeking a directorship or
managerial position with a NASDAQ issuer. On
the surface, the proposal establishes a two-part threshold: 1.
Is there an individual with a �history of significant securities or
commodities violations?� 2.
Does such an individual intend to exercise management, control or
influence over a NASDAQ
issuer/candidate? Assuming
that both questions result in �yes�
answers, I believe the NASD implements a rebuttable presumption that a listing
application (or a continued listing) from a company affiliated with such an
individual will serve to facilitate further violative conduct to the public�s
detriment. Increasingly the
NASD�s approach has become more doctrinaire on the qualitative issues and has
become tantamount to a zero-tolerance policy.
Among the reasons advanced for taking such a rigid posture is that a
NASDAQ listing effectively constitutes an exemption from the Commission�s
Penny Stock rules.[vi]
Notably, that NASDAQ exemption relieves a broker-dealer from undertaking
federally mandated risk disclosure to customers purchasing a Penny Stock.
Accordingly, such an exemption provides ample opportunity for mayhem.
Nonetheless, the Commission cautioned the NASD against any unwarranted blanket
policy and pointedly required that the SRO �form a reasonable belief as to
whether certain persons connected with an issuer may be predisposed to engage in
further violative conduct contrary to interests of the investing public.�[vii]
Practitioners
should focus on the following language in the Criteria Order: [T]he
rule change will also provide important guidance to the NASD review process, and
will alert issuers seeking inclusion in NASDAQ NON-DISCLOSURE
AND DUE DILIGENCE As
many a practitioner has unfortunately learned, clients often lie about
regulatory violations or securities-related convictions. On the other hand, in
some non-disclosure situations, the client is simply uninformed or misinformed
as to the actual circumstances of his or her criminal/regulatory history.
Nonetheless, effective corporate counsel will usually suggest that a
corporate client routinely verify the backgrounds of its control persons.
Initially, such verification may be nothing more complicated than paying
a third-party to perform a computerized search of 1) federal, state, and local
court criminal records, and 2) regulatory agencies� records.
Any disclosures should generally be followed up by obtaining underlying
documents, e.g., complaints, answers, decisions, etc. However, efforts to perform even cursory inquiries may pose
some unusual problems. Practitioners
involved in preparation of registration statements are usually familiar with the
need to make disclosures concerning directors, executive officers, promoters and
control persons under Regulations S-K and S-B, which under Items 401 state: Involvement
in Certain Legal Proceedings. Describe
any of the following events that occurred during the past five years and that
are material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of any director,
person nominated to become a director or executive officer of the registrant: (2)
Such person was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a named subject of a
pending criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor
offenses.[ix] In
addition to criminal disclosures, Regulations S-K and S-B also require
information concerning orders, judgment or decrees that enjoined, barred or
suspended from involvement in any business, securities, or banking activities.
Further, in the checklist provided by NASDAQ to companies interested in
listing, applicants are specifically urged to �determine whether any of the
Company�s officers, directors, or principal shareholders have been charged or
convicted of any charges involving fraud, embezzlement, insider trading, or any
other matter concerning dishonesty.�[x]
Industry
lawyers are accustomed to regulatory inquiries asking whether an individual has
ever been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendere in a foreign
court to a misdemeanor or felony;
whether a foreign financial regulatory authority ever found an individual to
have made false statements, engaged in fraudulent conduct, violated
investment-related regulations, etc.[xi] Notwithstanding that these
latter items are on an application form used by individuals seeking to become
registered persons, they indicate a standard of regulatory inquiry that
corporate clients should expect will be applied to them during the NASDAQ
listing process. One common
pitfall is that corporate practitioners frequently fail to appreciate that the
NASD�s inquiry as to an individual�s background is not limited to the
five-year horizon reflected in the federal regulations cited above.
Corporate
attorneys are often struck as to the difference between the precise requirements
(and years of statutory interpretation and caselaw) involved in the registration
process at the Commission, and the more elastic requirements (and relatively
limited statutory interpretation and caselaw) involved in the listing process at
NASDAQ. Worse, in recent years the
listing process and attendant administrative appeals process at NASD has been
overhauled. As a result, lawyers
reviewing even somewhat recent statutory history or caselaw become frustrated
with the changes in departmental names and functions, and the revised interplay
between the NASD staff, departments, and hearing panels.
In
furthering a client�s NASDAQ listing application, lawyers may find themselves In
any event, let�s examine two of the leading cases involving NASDAQ qualitative
requirements. Where possible I have
included relevant dates to demonstrate the �relevancy� of so-called aged
criminal/regulatory matters and to indicate the delays inherent in exhausting
one�s administrative remedies. JJFN:
The propensity issue In
1997, the Commission affirmed the NASD's decision to deny an issuer's request
that its securities be included on the NASDAQ SmallCap market because the
issuer's controlling shareholder, paid consultant, and promoter has been
convicted of felony tax law violations.[xiii]
JJFN, a Delaware corporation, was organized in late 1995. David Miller
was a "key person" who had been engaged as a "financial
consultant" to JJFN since its inception and was deemed the Company's
"promoter." As of June 30, 1996, Miller and members of his family
owned or controlled more than half of the 15.96 million JJFN shares then
outstanding. In
April 1992, Miller pled guilty to three felony tax fraud charges, admitting that
in 1983, 1984, and 1985 he filed, and conspired with others to file, false
federal tax returns on behalf of a company of which he was the president and
chief executive officer. Miller was sentenced in October 1992 to 20 months in
prison, fined $ 40,000, and assessed the costs of his incarceration. He entered
federal prison in December 1992, was paroled in December 1993, and was released
from custody in May 1994. On
February 1, 1996, JJFN applied to the NASD for inclusion of its securities in
the NASDAQ SmallCap Market. By letter dated July 22, 1996, NASDAQ staff denied
JJFN's application based on Miller's association with the Company. The staff
asserted that, given Miller's "regulatory history" and the
"potential influence and control he may exercise over the Company . . . it
would be to the detriment of the investing public"[xiv]
to list JJFN's shares on the NASDAQ SmallCap Market. JJFN
appealed the staff's decision to the NASDAQ Listing Qualifications Panel
("Qualifications Panel"). On August 22, 1996, the Qualifications Panel
found that Miller's "involvement in [JJFN] both as a shareholder and as a
consultant is substantial."[xv]
The panel determined that Miller's felony tax fraud convictions "related to
his role as the officer of a company."[xvi]
The panel further explained that it was affirming the staff's denial of JJFN's
application "in order to preserve and strengthen the quality of and public
confidence in the market, and in order to protect prospective investors and the
public interest."[xvii] In
late August 1996, JJFN appealed the Qualifications Panel's decision to the
NASDAQ Listing and Hearing Review Committee ("Review Committee"). On
December 20, 1996, the Review Committee affirmed the Qualifications Panel's
decision to deny inclusion of JJFN's securities in the NASDAQ SmallCap Market.
Although the Review Committee noted Miller's offers to terminate his consulting
contract with JJFN, to sell his JJFN shares, and to place the shares held by his
family in a voting trust, it found that Miller "appear[s] to play an
essential role in [JJFN]" and that JJFN is "dependent on [Miller's]
expertise."[xviii] The Review Committee
voiced its concern that Miller's "past violative conduct might indicate a
propensity to engage in conduct detrimental of [sic] public investors."[xix]
JJFN appealed to the Commission on January 21, 1997. Possibly
cognizant of a need to rationalize Miller�s filing of false tax returns as
securities industry related misconduct, the Commission�s decision stressed
that Miller's conviction for tax fraud legitimately may be considered by the
NASD to be evidence of a propensity for future conduct violative of securities
laws or regulations. Further, the
Commission underscored that both the tax and the securities regulatory schemes
depend on the honor, candor, and integrity of regulated persons to report
accurately to the regulatory authority the information sought by such authority.
JJFN
also asserted that Miller's conviction was not relevant because it was
"remote in time." Although the Commission conceded that the conduct on
which the conviction was based occurred more than ten years earlier, Miller
admitted to a pattern of conduct violative of the tax laws that persisted for
three years. In addition, the 1992 conviction itself and Miller's resulting
prison term (which ended in 1994) were relatively recent to the 1996 application
for listing. The Company argued
that Miller's conviction must be viewed in light of his entire career, which
"has been unmarked by any escutcheon except his tax conviction."[xx]
Contrary to this assertion, however, this Commission noted that it had twice
brought enforcement actions against Miller or entities with which he is
associated. JJFN
further asserted that the NASD's denial of JJFN's application constituted the
"de facto promulgation" of a new rule barring absolutely the inclusion
in NASDAQ of issuers that have control persons or key personnel who have been
convicted of a felony. The Commission disagreed with that contention and
sustained the NASD's determination. Notwithstanding
the Commission�s discomfort with the allegation concerning the imposition of
an unwritten rule against any felon, the simple fact is that JJFN represents a
striking expansion of the more circumspect language of the Criteria Order: �a
person with a history of significant securities or commodities violations.�[xxi]
Miller was a felon but the facts do not necessarily support the
contention that he had a history of securities or commodities violations, let
alone a �significant� history of same.
Regardless of the Commission�s protestations to the contrary, it
appears that the emerging message isall felons
beware. DHB:
An uneasy feeling Finally,
in what many view as the seminal case on this issue, the Commission affirmed the
NASD's decision to deny an issuer's request that its securities be included on
the NASDAQ SmallCap market, because the stock bid price did not meet the
required minimum and the issuer's controlling shareholder, officer, and director
had a history of securities law violations.[xxii]
On
December 18, 1992, in settlement of an injunctive complaint filed by the
Commission, David Brooks consented to a permanent injunction by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, against aiding and
abetting violations of Section 15(b) and 15(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 15b3-1 thereunder. On December 23, 1992, Brooks consented to an
order in which the Commission barred him from association with any broker,
dealer, municipal securities dealer, investment adviser, or investment company,
with a right to apply after five years to become so associated. In addition,
Brooks consented to an order directing that he not cause, directly or
indirectly, any broker or dealer registered with this Commission to fail to
disclose in its Form BD information and documents concerning the broker-dealer
and its associated persons, as required by Commission rule. Brooks also
consented to a further order directing that he not cause, directly or
indirectly, any broker or dealer registered with this Commission to fail to
establish, maintain, or enforce written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to prevent the firm's and its associated persons' misuse of material
non-public information. Brooks was also ordered to pay, jointly and severally
with Jeffrey Brooks Securities ("JBS") and Jeffrey Brooks (his
brother), a civil penalty of $405,000. On
October 22, 1992, shortly before Brooks agreed to the bar order, he organized
DHB Capital Group, Inc. (DHB) as a holding company. Brooks is the controlling
shareholder of the Company, as well as the Chairman of the Board, Chief
Executive Officer, and Director. On July 15, 1994, the DHB filed the application
for inclusion in the NASDAQ SmallCap Market that is at issue in the appeal. In
August 1994 the NASD staff advised DHB the then inside bid price on the
Over-The-Counter ("OTC") Bulletin Board for DHB�s securities was
2-9/16, a price below the required minimum bid price of $ 3.00 per share. The
NASD staff also denied the application because of Brooks' history of securities
law violations. DHB's subsequent appeal to the NASDAQ Listing Qualifications
Committee ("Qualifications Committee") resulted in the same decision
to deny inclusion, largely on the basis of the consent injunction entered
against Brooks in 1992, the serious nature of the allegations made by the
Commission in 1992, and the Commission's bar order. In
March 1995, the NASD Hearing Review Committee ("Review Committee")
affirmed the Qualifications Committee's decision not to include DHB's securities
in the NASDAQ SmallCap Market. In addition to the bid price issues, the
Committee further found that, "given the extremely serious nature of the
SEC allegations made against Brooks, and the fact that he was only recently
enjoined," exclusion of DHB from the NASDAQ SmallCap Market "is
necessary to protect investors and the public interest and to maintain public
confidence" in the NASDAQ SmallCap Market. The
Commission concluded, in pertinent part, that the NASD's reliance on Brooks'
disciplinary history as a further basis for denial was appropriate: The
facts remain that Brooks has a history of serious securities law violations [Ed:
footnote omitted] and a significant ownership interest in DHB, and proposes to
retain his position as a DHB director. We do not find it unreasonable that the
NASD, reviewing both Brooks' past conduct and his proposed level of involvement
in DHB, remains uneasy about the potential for illicit conduct in connection
with the operation of DHB or the market for its securities, and unwilling to
expose public investors to that possibility.[xxiii] In
what has now become a much-cited position, the Commission concluded that Investors
are entitled to assume that the securities in the system meet the system's
standards and that "the risk associated with investing in NASDAQ is market
risk rather than the risk that the promoter or other persons exercising
substantial influence over the issuer is acting in an illegal manner." [Ed:
footnote omitted] Even in cases
where the NASD has delisted a security from the NASDAQ Smallcap Market (in
contrast to denying initial inclusion as in this case), we have acknowledged
that, while exclusion from a quotation system may hurt existing investors,
primary emphasis must be placed on the interests of prospective future
investors. [Ed: footnote omitted] [xxiv] CONCLUSION Even
if all the proverbial numbers add up, NASDAQ may still not be willing to list
your corporate client if the qualitative factors are lacking.
Unfortunately, client counseling on such matters is often reduced to a
guessing game: NASD might agree
to that if you also do this. The
most common points of contention between NASD staff and applicants are Clients should be prepared to negotiate these issues and have a game plan as to whether they are prepared to settle largely on the staff�s terms or litigate the matter administratively. Finally, with the pending demutualization of NASDAQ from the NASD practitioners may soon be confronted with different administrative procedures and varying concerns. [i] Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Provide the NASD with Discretionary Authority to Exclude an Issuer from the NASDAQ Stock Market or Impose Additional or More Stringent Criteria for Inclusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-34151 (June 3, 1994), 1994 SEC LEXIS 1692 (June 3, 1994) (the "Criteria Order"). [ii] On January 11, 1996 the Commission approved a wholesale revision of the NASD�s rules and regulations structure (herein, the �Manual�). Accordingly, former Schedule D to the By-Laws is now found under the 4000 Rules series of The NASDAQ Stock Market. Specific reference is cited to Rule 4300 series: Qualification Requirements for NASDAQ Stock Market Securities (�NASDAQ . . . will exercise broad discretionary authority over the initial and continued exclusion of securities in NASDAQ in order to maintain the quality of and public confidence in its market.�); Rule 4330: Suspension or Termination of Inclusion of a Security and Exceptions to Inclusion Criteria; and the Rule 4800 series: Procedures for Review of NASDAQ Listing Determinations. [iii]Criteria Order, 1994 SEC LEXIS 1692 at page 1. [iv] In the Matter of Tassaway, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.11291, 1975 SEC LEXIS 2057 (Mar. 13, 1975). See,Criteria Order, at page 13;In the Matter of the Application of AIR L.A., Inc. and CVD SERVICES, Inc. for Review of Action Concerning the Operations of the NASDAQ Stock Market Taken by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-34491, 1994 SEC LEXIS 2385 (August 3, 1994). [v] Criteria Order. at page 3-4. [vi] Id. at page 5. See,17 CFR �240.3a51-1, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 3a51-1: Definition of Penny Stock;17 CFR �240.15g-2 through 240.15g�9, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rules 15g-2 through 15g-9. [vii] Criteria Order. at page 5. [viii] Criteria Order. at page 17-18. [ix] Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229, Item 401(f) and (g); Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228 Item 401(d) [x] Going
Public and Listing on the U.S. Securities Markets, Appendix D (Due Diligence
Examination Outline) I(B)(2),http://www.nasdaq.com/about/appd.pdf.
[xi] Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer, Rev. Form U-4, Items 23A, B and D (8/1/1999) (�Form U-4�) [xii] Id. at page 1, Explanation of Terms [xiii] Order Dismissing Review Proceedings, In the Matter of the Application of JJFN Services, Inc., For Review of Action Taken by the National Association Of Securities Dealers, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 39343, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2393 (November 21, 1997). [xiv]
In the Matter of JJFN, at page 5-6. [xv]
Id. [xvi]
Id. [xvii]
Id. [xviii]
Id.
at 6-7. [xix] Id. [xx]
Id.at
8. [xxi]
Criteria Order
at 14. [xxii] Order Dismissing Review Proceedings, In the Matter of the Application of DHB Capital Group, Inc., For Review of Action Taken by The National Association Of Securities Dealers, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 37069, 1996 SEC LEXIS 989 (April 5, 1996). [xxiii] In the Matter of JJFN, at page 12-13. [xxiv] Id. at page 14-15. |
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